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The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System was
developed to facilitate budgeting in terms of military forces
and weapon systems instead of the resource categories of mili-
tary personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance,
research, and construction. Costs were to be decided for the
lifetime of a system, not just for the budget year. The plan-
ning and programming phases of PPBS have enabled the Secretary
of Defense to see major force and support issues and have
helped him to make effectively his decision. The Thai Minis-
try of Defense has attempted in many ways to develop the Royal
Thai Armed Forces PPBS by choosing the U. S. system as a model
for development of the Thai system and adapting it to fit the
Thai needs. Today, the RTARF PPBS progresses slowly and the
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The development of effective resource management systems
is essential for the achievement of a satisfactory military
program. Since resources appropriated for national security
each year are limited, they must be efficiently allocated.
National defense problems are economic problems. The nation's
resources are scarce and these resources must be used to
achieve many objectives of the nation and its individual
citizens: national security, a high standard of living, public
health, welfare and education, and so on. The more efficient
the use of resources for national security, the more resources
the nation can have for other purposes. Planning, programming,
and budgeting together constitute a system by which the objec-
tives and resources, and the interrelations among them, are
taken into account to accomplish a coherent and comprehensive
program of action for the government as a whole. Program
budgeting involves the use of techniques that facilitate
explicit consideration of the pursuit of policy objectives in
terms of their economic costs, both for the present and the
future. To be more specific, no government, whatever its
resources, can avoid the need for compromises among various
objectives.
The task of arranging the essential compromises among
various objectives is the function of planning, programming,
and budgeting. To make those compromises, it is essential
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that the various government activities be transformed into
terms of a common denominator, the money. For example, it
is difficult to compare the relative merits of an additional
infantry division or a hospital. It is often easier to com-
pare the relative merits of spending an additional one
thousand million bahts (equivalent to fifty million U. S.
dollars) in one direction or the other. In comparison, it
seems essential to find out how much an additional thousand
bahts will add to military strength and how much to the hos-
pital services. While defense and public health cannot be
measured in simple quantitative terms, quantitative informa-
tion can throw light on the consequences of spending money
in various directions.
There are many ways in which money can be spent on
defense and public health. To make rational comparisons,
each major activity must be divided into meaningful subacti-
vities. Modern defense, at least, requires considerations in
terms of strategic forces and limited war forces. Public
health must be divided into development of health resources,
prevention and control of health problems, provision of health
services, and general support. Major programs should be
considered in terms of subprograms, and at the end of the
scale one reaches the manpower, materiel, and supplies used
by the government in support of these activities. Such con-
siderations and calculations should lead to the concept of
resources (money) used in optimal or preferred ways to achieve
policy objectives.

All budgeting is essentially a matter of preparing for
the future, but modern budgeting involves long-range pro-
jections into a highly uncertain future. The government can
determine its policies most effectively if it selects ration-
ally among alternative courses of action, with as full knowl-
edge as possible of the implications of those alternatives.
The need for choice occurs as result of scarce resources,
and a fundamental concept is that rational choice is better
than irrational choice. The intelligent government must
choose not only among various courses of government activity,
but also between the government's total program and the pri-
vate sector of the economy. The primary purpose of program
budgeting is to facilitate the making of these difficult
choices. Planning, programming, and budgeting focus on the
process of comparison and coordination, which involves
[ Reference 1]
:
1. Appraisals and comparisons of various government
activities in terms of their contributions to national
objectives;
2. Determination of how objectives can be attained with
minimum expenditure of resources;
3. Projection of government activities over an adequate
time horizon;
4. Comparison of the relative contributions of private
and public activities to national objectives; and
5. Revisions of objectives, programs, and budgets in the
light of experience and changing circumstances.
10

These operations are inherent in any planning, program-
ming, and budgetary process. Program budgeting involves more
explicit recognition of the need to perform them than has
been traditional. It also involves the application of new
analytical techniques as an aid to the exercise of the human
judgment on which choices must ultimately rest.
It is apparent from this statement of the budgetary prob-
lem that the traditional distinction between policy making
and budgeting, or between setting of goals and deciding on how
to attain them, is inaccurate and misleading. While the
government can have a general desire and intention to defend
the country, it cannot have a defense objective that is opera-
tionally meaningful until it is aware of the specific military
implications of devoting resources to defense. As a part of
that awareness, it should know the consequences of using
defense resources in alternative ways. The question of allo-
cative efficiency is thus intimately bound to the question of
the determination of goals. An adequate programming system
must serve both purposes.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS
To help understand the need for developing the Thai
financial management system, problems of the existing system
are outlined as follows:
1. The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) budget formulation
procedures are antiquated. The budgetary process seems to
include haggling and bargaining. The resulting budget as it
is, is a one-line, lump sum request to Parliament for funds.
11

There is little recognizable relationship between plans and
supporting budgets. The programming function does not exist.
2. New plans do not consider all alternatives in rela-
tion to cost and benefit terms. Decisions made at top levels
of the RTARF are at best subjective judgments based on little
factual information about their impact from a total resource
standpoint.
3. The RTARF decision process does not cut across all
the functional lines.
4. The problem is further complicated after the Parlia-
ment appropriates the funds. The Ministry of Defense (MOD)
allocation process follows a percentage basis determined by
what past years per cent of funds allocated to the individual
services has been.
5. Military planning is accomplished in terms of forces
and major weapon systems determined as many as ten years in
advance. On the contrary, budgeting in terms of appropriation
categories acceptable to the Parliament is planned only one
year ahead.
6. Military planning and budgeting are not compatible.
The costs of the developed plans have always been much greater
than the amount approved by the Parliament since the planners
performed planning with little regard to budget constraint.
Actually, the order of priority of activities, weapon system,
and forces is the responsibility of each service. This creates
competition and imbalances among the services.
7. When the plan and the budget have been presented to
the Minister of Defense for budget review and the money
12

requested exceeded appropriation, he would cut the military
programs. Most forces and weapon systems have been decided
without cost-benefit analysis among alternatives. This kind
of decision often has led to overcommitment and inefficient
resource allocation.
8. The budget has failed to provide the detailed inform-
ation required to relate costs of weapons to their military
effectiveness. It does not disclose the full-time spectrum
of proposed programs since its own horizon is generally
limited to one year.
9. The budget has also failed to furnish, on a systematic
basis, sound cost data on the individual weapon systems and
force units for any period beyond the budget year. Without
this information, decision-makers lack a basis for deciding
the relative costs and military worth of alternative choices.
An understanding of the above problem is necessary to
justify why the RTARF needs a new financial management system
as an important tool for the decision-makers. The decision-
making process needs to be strengthened by establishing a
bridge between the existing independent "planning" and
"budgeting" systems, thereby closing the gap between them.
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the Royal
Thai Armed Forces planning, programming, and budgeting system
was developed. This thesis also identifies problems in the
Thai PPBS development, and suggests solutions to those prob-




II. A STUDY OF UNITED STATES PLANNING
,
PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEMS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide understanding
of the United States Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) upon which the Thai system is based, so that
the reader can follow the Thai PPBS easier in the next chapter.
The United States system was chosen as the model for develop-
ment of the Thai system because the United States had
developed its system ten years ahead of Thailand's, and during
those ten years, much progress was made. It is important to
try to adapt it to fit the Thai needs. This transfer of exist-
ing technology should yield several benefits to the Thais:
1. It can increase the productivity and reduce the cost
of the Thai government's development effort. By applying the
technology that has been previously developed, the government
can avoid duplication of effort and improve efficiency.
2. It can increase the probability of selecting the best
technology for the tasks.
3. It can shorten the time between the development of a
system and its first successful application.
4. It can help avoid errors or mistakes that have been
made by the United States during development of the system.
A. THE ESSENTIAL IDEAS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES PLANNING,
PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) must insure that the
interests of the nation take precedence over the special
14

institutional interests of the military services, the defense
contractors, the project managers, the scientists, the locali-
ties, and the other groups that make up or depend on the
Defense Department.
PPBS was developed and implemented in the Department of
Defense (DOD) in the early 1960 's in order to provide the
Secretary of Defense the information and management tools for
shaping defense programs in the national interest. The basic
idea behind PPBS is that decision-making should be based on
explicit criteria in the national interest as opposed to
decision-making by compromise among various institutional and
parochial interests.
Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith [Ref. 2] have dis-
cussed six interesting basic ideas behind PPBS as follows:
1. Development of Publicly Defensible Criteria
The first fundamental idea of PPBS is to develop
publicly defensible criteria, openly and thoroughly debated
by all interested parties, that can be used by the SECDEF as
measures of the national need and adequacy of defense programs
Initially, such criteria may be very crude but one has
to start somewhere, and the value of even rough statements of
such criteria is that it generates a debate on better ways
of defining the national interest in defense programs.
2. Explicit Consideration of Alternatives at the
Top Decision Level
The second basic idea underlying PPBS is the explicit
consideration of alternatives at the top decision level. If
the Secretary of Defense is to shape the defense program in
15

the national interest, he must also be able to choose from
among a number of alternatives. Each alternative should be
a balanced, feasible solution to the problem. Choosing
among real alternatives is the only way the Secretary of
Defense can effectively translate his judgments about national
security matters into policy. Thus, he and the President can
choose a defense budget in full awareness of its implications
for the military posture and in light of information on
whether extra spending would bring military benefits which
justify the sacrifice of other competing public programs.
This search for alternatives, and the explicit consideration
by the top level decision-makers is an important part of the
defense decision-making process.
3. Consideration of Needs and Costs Together
The third basic idea underlying PPBS is to consider
needs and costs together. This requires identifying the costs
of accomplishing major military missions such as strategic
retaliation, strategic mobility, and anti-submarine warfare
rather than identifying costs by object classes of expendi-
tures, such as personnel, operations and maintenance, procure-
ment, and the like. Military needs and costs must be
considered together. Ends and means interact. What is worth
trying to do depends in large part on how much it costs to do
it. If an administration is not willing to meet the costs
implied by its foreign policy objectives, then it should
revise its objectives to bring them into line with the budgets
it is willing to provide. Otherwise, the consequence will be
16

an imbalance between objectives and forces, and an imbalance
among programs designed to support the actual forces. In
other words, strategy decisions and budget decisions cannot
be sensibly separated.
4 . Forward Force and Financial Plan
The fourth major idea behind PPBS is that of a for-
ward force and financial plan, i.e., a plan which projects
into the future the foreseeable implications of current de-
cisions. Such a plan is not meant to be an inflexible blue-
print for the future. Rather it is a projection of the
implications of past decisions, a set of official planning
assumptions, and a point of departure in the continuing search
for improvements. Having such a plan forces the decision-
maker to look into the future to the time when today's
decisions will have their most important effects.
The practical result of tying together needs and costs
and of having a forward force and financial plan is the Five-
Year Defense Plan (FYDP) , one of the basic management tools
in DOD which makes PPBS work. The FYDP is a series of force
tables which show an eight-year projection of forces and a
five-year projection of costs displayed in mission-oriented
programs. The FYDP not only ties together force and financial
planning but provides a vehicle for insuring that the process
of changing the approved program is orderly and that the
changes are accurately recorded. The FYDP is also the official
source of planning assumptions. It is an authoritative record
of what the Secretary of Defense has tentatively approved for
purpose of force and financial planning. In other words, all
. 17

interested parties within DOD know how many and what kinds
of divisions, squadrons, ships, etc., have been authorized
and how many men and how much money it will take to support
them. By clearly relating forces to costs and to budget,
the FYDP gives financial planning within DOD the same output
orientation as force planning. This is a major improvement
over the pre- 19 61 system. At that time, force planning was
long range, expressed in terms of combat units, and performed
mainly by military planners in the Joint Staff and the
services. Financial planning was short range, expressed in
terms of objects of expenditure, and performed mainly by
civilians in the Comptroller organization. There was little
integration of the two. Given this situation, it is not sur-
prising that there were serious imbalances, such as divisions
without equipment and ammunitions or the airlift to move them,
and aircraft without spare parts. With the FYDP, there is a
common planning base in the literally hundreds of separate
agencies and offices in DOD. The left hand can know what the
right hand does and plans to do. Logistic planners can see
how many and what kinds of divisions are planned and budget
for ammunition accordingly. Each service can see what is
planned for the other and thus better determine what forces
are needed for common missions. The air force, for example,
can see how large an army is projected and plan its airlift
capability accordingly. Furthermore, with a common set of
planning assumptions, the wastefulness associated with start-
ing or continuing a great many individual service projects
18

which will all do the same job can be and has been reduced.
By providing this common planning base and tying together
forces and costs by major mission area over time, the FYDP
has contributed significantly to the acquisition of more
balanced and better supported forces.
The very characteristics of effective management tools
such as the FYDP have led to much of the political opposition
to PPBS
.
Since the FYDP does constitute an official record
or program decisions and tentative planning assumptions, it
requires the Secretary to make explicit controversial de-
cisions. This is a quite different procedure from the pre-
1961 method of simply setting a one-year budget ceiling,
without nailing down choices between competing programs. One-
year ceilings usually led to starting and continuing more and
larger programs than the budget could adequately finance,
since the long-term financial implications of decisions were
not explicitly considered and competing claims for resources
did not have to meet head on. This, in turn, led the services
to hold onto their prestige items (divisions, wings, and ships)
at the expense of less glamorous—but essential—support items,
causing a progressive deterioration in the real effectiveness
and combat readiness of the forces. In the short run, however,
a simple budget ceiling generates much less political heat




5. Active Use of Analytical Staff and the Regular
Use of Analysis
The fifth important idea of PPBS is the active use
of analytical staff at the top policy-making level and the
regular use of analysis as an aid to judgment. Most large
organizations, governmental or otherwise, have some kind of
analytical or planning staff somewhere in the organizational
structure. Often, these groups are little more than "window
dressing." They are not active contributors to the decision-
making process. They do not report directly to the top
decision-makers nor do they receive frequent guidance from
them as to what studies to undertake for what reasons. More
often than not, they do studies that are not read, on subjects
that are not important. Their continued existence depends on
remaining non-controversial, and most of them excel in this
regard. In the United States DOD, the active use of analytical
staff at the top policy-making levels has been from the
beginning, a key element of the PPBS. The staff that is
referred to is the Systems Analysis Office.
The Systems Analysis Office was established to gather
and analyze information relevant to forces and other major
requirements from these different areas and to help the
Secretary of Defense fit the pieces together. In other words,
it integrated the cost, effectiveness, and requirement data
and the recommendations of the services and Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) in such a way that the Secretary could understand
what capabilities he was buying, at what cost, and how they
20

related to overall defense needs. It regularly provided the
Secretary with the staff assistance necessary to identify
and analyze alternative levels and mixes of forces so that
his choices were not limited to those proposed by the services
and the JCS
.
The Systems Analysis Office reported directly to the
Secretary of Defense and undertook studies directly at his
request. These studies were then formally reviewed by all
interested parties and, upon completion of the review, formed
a major input to the decision-making process. The purpose
of such studies was not primarily to determine the "best"
solution, even given a certain set of assumptions. Rather,
their purpose was to sort out which assumptions were important
and show how they affected the outcome, so that judgment could
be focused on the really crucial issues. In short, the pur-
pose of analysis as used in DOD was to illuminate and inform
judgment, not to replace it.
6. The Necessity for Open and Explicit Analysis
The final basic idea of PPBS is that analysis should
be open and explicit. That is, each analysis should be made
available to all interested parties so that they can see what
assumptions were used and so they can retrace the steps lead-
ing to the conclusions. Open and explicit analysis is the
best protection against persistence in error and against
reaching conclusions on the basis of hidden or rigged assump-
tions. It also helps to build confidence in the results of
an analysis. All calculations, assumptions, empirical data >
21

and judgments should be described in an analysis in such a
way that they can be checked, tested, debated, discussed,
and possibly refuted. Adversary proceedings are the best
stimulant to analytical progress. More importantly, analysis
should be tested, checked, and debated by all interested
parties. Analysis should not be believed simply because
it is an analysis. It is the method, not the authority, of
analysis that is important.
One of the most significant achievements of PPBS in
DOD has been the stimulation of intense but orderly debate
over the relevant program issues, not just over arbitrary
allocations of budget ceilings. Indeed, in a very meaning-
ful, practical sense, PPBS is a set of ground rules for con-
structive debate. This aspect of the system is especially
interesting, in view of the charges that it has "shut off
discussion" and "frozen the military out of decisions." In
fact, one of the most successful aspects of PPBS has been
the focusing of the inevitable conflict and debate within
DOD onto a much more constructive and objective level than
before.
Open and explicit analysis, reviewed and commented
on by all interested parties, is fundamental to the workings
of PPBS in the Pentagon. The analyses underlying the
Secretary's decisions are circulated for comment and review
by all interested parties. These comments go directly to the
Secretary. The procedures are designed so that the Secretary
can hear all sides, so that no one has a monoply on the
information going to him. They help to insure that all
22

important assumptions are made explicit, that all interested
parties are given "due process/' and that all opinions are
fully considered.
How the System Works
In summary, decision-making based on explicit criteria
of the national interest; the consideration of real alterna-
tives; evaluating needs and costs together; a forward force
and financial plan; the active use of analytical staff at the
top policy-making level, and the regular use of analysis as
an aid to judgment; the concept of open and explicit analysis--
these are fundamental ideas upon which PPBS was developed and
operates in DOD. These ideas are clearly reflected in princi-
pal management tools that have made PPBS work. They are also
reflected in the procedures established for debate and review.
It is these underlying ideas and not the specific tools and
procedures that are fundamental. There is nothing easy or
mechanical about PPBS. It is not a closed, rigid, or perfected
system. In its broadest sense, it is an approach to manage-
ment—an approach that has helped to channel the initiative,
drive, imagination, dedication, hard work and judgment of the
civilian and military leaders in DOD along more rational and
objective lines.
PPBS has provided the Secretary of Defense with more
useful information and meaningful alternatives than he had
before. It has provided an effective framework for making
and carrying out major program decisions in an informed and
orderly way. By unifying programming and budgeting, it has
23

closed the "gap" between force and financial planning. By
providing an official force plan, it has given the planners
and analysts in the whole department a firm foundation for
their planning and a solid point of departure for their
analyses. It has led to a major improvement in the quality
and relevance of debate over requirements. Under PPBS, the
idea of open and explicit analysis, reviewed and commented
on by all interested parties has been widely accepted. The
systematic search for real alternatives to prevent the
Secretary from being the prisoner of a single staff solution
has become the rule rather than the exception. The considera-
tion of requirements on an overall mission basis, rather than
on the basis of a single service, has led to the elimination
of much unnecessary duplication in research and development
projects. Most importantly, PPBS has helped to give the
Secretary of Defense the information and analyses to see what
the major alternatives are from a department-wide point of
view and to help him to make a reasoned choice among them.
It has given him a way to structure debate over defense
issued along objective lines. In an organization as large
and diverse as the Department of Defense, where many issues
are highly emotional, where the "facts" are hard to pin down,
and where parochial and institutional interests constantly





B. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGETING
BEFORE 19 61
Prior to 1961, the Secretary of Defense lacked the tools
to manage the overall effort on a truly unified basis, so he
had to resort to what might be considered as the "budget
ceiling" approach. By this approach, the President would
state the general level of National Defense expenditures which
he believed was appropriate for world situations and U.S.
overall economic and fiscal policies. The Secretary of
Defense, by some means, would allocate the Defense budget
among the three military services. Each service would then
prepare and submit its basic requests, dividing its ceiling
among its own functions, units, and activities. Each service
would also present additional requests, which could not be
included in the given ceiling, in what was often referred to
as "addendum" budget, "B" list. All the budget submissions
were reviewed together by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense in an effort to achieve balance. This was the tradi-
tional method of preparing the Defense budget. It was realized
long ago that this was a rather inefficient method. Under
this method, each service had a tendency to exercise its own
priorities, favoring its own unique missions to the detriment
of the joint missions, attempting very hard to lay the founda-
tion for an increased share of the budget in future years by
focusing on attractive new weapon systems, and defending the
overall size of its own forces even at the cost of readiness.
The final result was imbalance in effective military forces
25

despite the fact that the decisions were made by patriotic
high ranking officers, and by dedicated civilians as well,
who were convinced that they were behaving to the best inter-
ests of the nation as well as to their own service. For
instance, the Army utilized its scarce resources to maintain
the number of its divisions, although this meant that they
lacked equipment and supplies to fight for more than a few
weeks. The Navy gave overriding priority to its own nuclear
attack forces—notably the aircraft carriers—while its anti-
submarine warfare capability was relatively neglected and its
escort capability atrophied. The Air Force gave overriding
priority to the strategic retaliatory bombers and missiles,
starving the tactical air units required to support the Army
ground operations and the airlift units required to move the
limited war forces quickly to far-off trouble spots.
Moreover, since attention was concentrated on only the
next year's budget, the services always tended to propose
large numbers of "new starts," the full cost dimensions of
which would only become apparent in subsequent years. Another
unsatisfactory point in this method of attempting to exercise
control and direction of defense effort through the annual
budget was the almost complete separation between budgeting
and military planning as stated by Charles J. Hitch [Ref. 3]
as follows:
1. These critical important functions were performed by
two different groups of people--the planning by military




2. Budget control was exercised by the Secretary of
Defense but planning remained essentially in the Services.
It was not until 1955-56 that the first Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP) projecting the requirements for major
forces some four to five years into the future, was prepared
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, but the early
JSOP was essentially a "pasting together" of unilaterally
developed Service plans.
3. Where as the planning horizon extended four or more
years into the future, the budget was projected only one
year ahead, although it was clear to all involved that the
lead time from the start of a weapon development to the
equipping of the forces ranged from five to ten years, de-
pending on the character of the particular development effort.
4. Planning was performed in terms of missions, weapon
systems, and military units or forces—the "outputs" of the
Defense Department; budgeting, on the other hand, was done
in terms of such "inputs" or intermediate products as personnel,
operation and maintenance, procurement, construction, etc.,
and there was little or no machinery for translating one into
the other.
5. Budgeting, however crudely, faced up to fiscal reali-
ties. The planning was fiscally unrealistic and, therefore,
of little help to the decision-makers. The total implicit
budget costs of the unilateral Service plans or the Joint
Strategic Objective Plans always far exceeded any budget that
any Secretary of Defense or administration was willing to
request of the Congress.
27 .

6. Military requirements tended to be stated in absolute
terms, without reference to their costs; but the military
effectiveness or military worth of any given weapons system
cannot logically be considered in isolation. It must be
considered in relation to its cost, and in a world in which
resources are limited, to the alternative uses to which
resources can be put. Military requirements are meaningful
only in terms of benefits to be gained in relation to their
cost. Accordingly, resource costs and military worth have
to be scrutinized together.
As a consequence, the Secretary of Defense each year was
in a difficult position to judge on forces and programs with-
out enough information and all within the few weeks allocated
to his budget review. In addition, every year the plans and
programs of each of the Services had to be cut back severely
to fit the budget ceiling, by program cancellations, stretch-
outs, or postponements—but only for that year. Beyond the
budget year, unrealistic plans continued to burgeon. Perhaps
next year the ceiling would be higher.
C. UNITED STATES DOD BUDGETING AFTER 19 61
After Robert S. McNamara became the Secretary of Defense,
he tried to take the initiative in the planning and direction
of the Defense program. He expressed his managerial philosophy
as a desire to manage the Defense effort in terms of meaning-
fulprogram entities, of "output" like the B-52 force, the
POLARIS force, the Army Airborne Division forces, etc., which
were dependent upon the inputs of equipment, personnel,
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supplies, facilities and funding, regardless of the appro-
priation account. He wanted to know the cost, for example,
of a B-52 wing, in order to optimize the allocation of
resources—he would have to know not only the cost of equip-
ping the wing but also the cost of manning and operating it
for its lifetime or at least for a reasonable period of years
in the future. Then he was able to evaluate the cost and
effectiveness of a B-52 wing as compared with other alterna-
tive courses of action. He wanted to know the total costs
of the forces assigned to each of the major missions— the
costs of the strategic offensive forces, the continental
defense forces, the general purpose forces, etc. As
General Maxwell Taylor [Ref. 4] had pointed out to a con-
gressional committee in 19 60:
... If we are called upon to fight, we will not be
interested in the services as such. We will be inter-
ested rather in task forces, those combinations of
Army, Navy, and Air Force which are functional in
nature, such as the atomic retaliatory forces, overseas
deployments, continental air defense forces, limited
war expeditionary forces, and the like. But the point
is that we do not keep our budget in these terms.
Hence, it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not
know what kind and how much defense we are buying with
any specific budget.
Charles J. Hitch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense of
that time, also had the same idea. He and the Secretary of
Defense, Robert S. McNamara, both recognized that DOD
financial management must serve many purposes. It must pro-
duce a budget in a form acceptable to the Congress. It must
set aside the funds in the same fashion in which they were
appropriated. It must give the managers at all levels in
29 .

the Defense Establishment the financial information needed
to do their particular jobs in an effective and efficient
way. It must provide the financial information needed by
other agencies of the Government—the Bureau of the Budget,
the Treasury, and the General Accounting Office.
Both Mr. Hitch and Mr. McNamara realized that the fin-
ancial management system must also produce the information
required by top Defense management to make the very vital
decisions, especially on the major forces and weapons sys-
tems required to perform the principal missions of the Defense
Establishment. They both recognized that the financial
management system that had existed for years could not furnish
the needed information in the form desired. Therefore, a new
function called "programming" would have to be included in the
financial management system. The new system was developed
and its product, the defense budget, submitted to the Congress
in January 1962. This was the first budget to be prepared
wholly under the McNamara administration.
Since the defense planning function and budget function
were already well organized, the function of programming was
only to span the gap between the two. Theoretically, it was
possible to recast both the planning and budget structures
in terms of major programs related to missions. As a matter
of fact, initially only the defense planning operation was
adapted to the program structure. The budget structure should
be similarly realigned. The budget might then take a form
such as shown in Table I.
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Table I. Possible Format of National Security Budget
Proposed
force composition Expenditures im-
Programs and (No. military units, plied by
Sub-programs where applicable) proposed programs


























Deterrence or Fighting of
Limited Wars
Ground Forces (Army , Marine)
Sea Power (Navy)
Tactical Air (AF,Navy)
Transport, Air & Sea (AF,Navy)
Military Aid to Other Countries
(Mutual Security)
Reserves for Mobilization
Military Units (Army, Navy ,AF)
Defense Production (OCDM)






Source: C. J. Hitch and R. N. McNamara, "The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age," p. 56, Atheneum, 1974
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The existing budget structure still serves some useful
purposes. It is prepared, essentially, in terms of resources
categories: (1) Military Personnel; (2) Operation and Main-
tenance; (3) Procurement; (4) Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation, (5) Military Construction. This is the type
of structure by which the Defense Department manages its
resources. While the military planning and the formulation
of programs should logically be prepared in terms of missions
and forces, the Department of Defense must be managed not
only in those terms but also in terms of resources. For
instance, the Department of Defense must manage the acquisi-
tion, training, and careers of military personnel; the opera-
tion of bases and facilities; the procurement of aircraft,
missiles, ships, and tanks; the research and development pro-
gram; and the construction of airfields, missile sites, quar-
ters, and other additions to the existing physical plant.
The present budget structure facilitates the estimation of
resource costs as well as the execution of the resource pro-
grams. This division of the budget by broad input or resource
categories is also flexible for the program adjustments that
are inevitably needed in the course of the budget year. Pro-
gram priorities and requirements tend to change even in the
course of a single year because of international developments,
technological breakthroughs (or disappointments) , and all
sorts of other events. It is significant not to freeze pro-
grams in appropriation bills.
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The Congress, especially the Appropriations Committees,
prefer the existing Defense budget system since they have
been working with it for a long time and have developed an
historical base for decision-making on the budget requests.
It is much easier for them to review a budget request of
$7.5 billion for pay and allowances for 1,000,000 active duty
Army personnel than to review a request of $25 billion for
the major program "General Purpose Forces." According to the
law, the President of the United States can present his budget
in any form he likes, but the Congress decides how the funds
will be appropriated and in turn, this determines how the
funds will be set aside. It is clear that the advantages of the
existing budget structure far exceed the disadvantages, which
are principally mechanical, namely, the need to transform
program categories into appropriation categories and vice
versa. However, the modern high-speed computers are well
designed to overcome the disadvantage. Therefore, the Depart-
ment of Defense decided to leave the budget structure undis-
turbed and to provide a bridge between planning and budgeting
with the new programming function. This brought about a three-
phase operation: planning-programming-budgeting.
1. Planning Phase
The first phase is military planning and requirements
determination. The JCS and the planners in the military depart-
ments play a very important role in this phase. What is looked
for in this stage are not just requirement studies in the tra-
ditional sense, but military-economic studies which compare
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alternative ways of achieving national security objectives,
and which determine the one that contributes most for a given
cost, or accomplishes a given objective at the minimum cost.
These are called "cost-effectiveness studies" or "systems
analyses .
"
At present, the planning-programming-budgeting process
starts with the Joint Strategic Objective Plan prepared by
the JCS with the assistance of military planners in the
Services. The format of this plan has been modified to bring
it into harmony with the new program structure. Therefore,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the opportunity to suggest to
the Secretary of Defense on a comprehensive basis the military
forces and programs which should be supported over the next
five to eight years. In the spring of each year, the Secretary
of Defense reviews these forces and programs recommended by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes preliminary decisions, and provides
to the military departments "a tentative guidance" to serve
as a basis for the preparation of their formal change proposals
to the official five-year program. The principal cost-effec-
tiveness studies must be completed at about the same time in
order to give the Secretary of Defense and his principal ad-
visors detailed information on the most crucial and difficult
problems.
The first list of required studies was developed by
Secretary McNamara. They were assigned to the JCS, the mili-
tary departments, and various elements of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. For example, one study was concerned
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with the problem of how many strategic bombers and missiles
were needed during the next decade to destroy priority tar-
gets. Another dealt with the investigation of requirement
for airlift and sealift capabilities to meet various contin-
gency war plans and the most economical means of providing that
lift. Still another involved the cost-effectiveness of:
(a) renewing existing items of ground equipment, (b) replacing
them with new equipment of the assembly lines, and (c) expedi-
ting the development of still better equipment. The Secretary
of Defense still creates many of these requirement studies.
Others are created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military
departments, and various elements of the Secretary's staff.
2. Programming Phase
The second phase is the initial development of the
program structure. All the myriad programs must be sorted and
regrouped into meaningful program elements, i.e., integrated
combinations of men, equipment, and installations, whose
effectiveness could be related to the national security objec-
tives. For example, the B-52 bomber force, together with all
the supplies, weapons, and manpower required to make it effec-
tive, is one such program element. Other examples are Attack
Carriers, F-4 Fighter Wings, and Recruit Training. Wherever
possible, program elements are measured in physical terms such
as numbers of aircraft per wing, numbers of operational missiles
on launchers, numbers of active ships, and so forth as well as
in financial terms, thus including both "input" and "output"
—
costs and benefits. Some program elements such as research
projects can only be measured in terms of inputs.
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Costs are measured in terms of "total obligational
authority" — the amount required to finance the program ele-
ment in a given year, regardless of when the funds are appro-
priated by the Congress, obligated, placed on contract, or
spent. It would be preferable, however, to measure the costs
of the program in terms of resources consumed, and from the
viewpoint of planning and decision-making. People are far
more interested in the full, completed cost of a program,
than in the precise phasing of the costs. To tie in with the
"branch point" at which critical decision must be made, program
costs are subdivided into three categories: development costs,
investment costs, and operating costs. Since the cost of
developing a new weapon system to the point where it could be
produced and deployed involves a large expense, a determination
to go ahead with full-scale development is, in itself, a major
decision. Therefore, it is better to know in advance the likely
cost of completing any major weapon development. In addition,
it is important to know the investment cost of providing
initial equipment for the proposed forces, as well as the oper-
ating costs of those forces each year. In many cases, for
example, the five-year operating cost of a B-52 wing are about
equal to the initial equipment costs, and in some few cases such
as an infantry division, the operating costs for just one year
are usually greater than the initial investment costs. To
facilitate the conversion of program costs to the budget cost
categories and vice versa, it is necessary to break down the
costs of each program element by the various budget appropria-
tion accounts under which it is financed. Operating costs
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actually are included in the "Military Personnel" and "Opera-
tion and Maintenance" appropriations, and where operating
spares are involved in the "Procurement" accounts as well.
Initial investment costs usually are included in the "Procure-
ment" and "Military Construction" appropriations.
There are more than 1,000 program elements divided
among the major programs. Where military forces are involved,
they are projected eight years ahead in order to give the
necessary lead time for the determination of the procurement
programs. All other program data, both physical and financial,
are projected five years ahead. The entire program is subject
to continual change and is, therefore, updated every other
month. Whenever there is a change in the cost of a program
element in the current fiscal year, it must also be reflected
in the budget for the same year and vice versa. The next task
is to associate the program elements to the major missions of
the Defense Department. The objective is to assemble associated
groups of program elements that, for decision purposes, should
be examined together, either because they support one another,
or because they are close substitutes. The unifying principle
underlying each major program is a common mission or set of
purposes for the elements involved. The following ten major
programs currently comprise the program structure of the U. S.
Department of Defense [Ref . 5 ]
:
Program 1 -- Strategic Forces
Program 2 -- General Purpose Forces
Program 3 — Intelligence and Communication
Program 4 — Airlift/Sealift
Program 5 — Guard and Reserve Forces
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Program 6 — Research and Development
Program 7 — Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 — Training, Medical, and Other General
Personnel Activities
Program 9 — Administration and Associated Activities
Program 10 — Support of Other Nations
Program 1 — Strategic Forces
consists of Strategic Offensive, Strategic Defensive, and
Civil Defense (as major subdivisions) . Includes command
organizations associated with these forces.
Program 2 — General Purpose Forces
consists of force-oriented program elements other than
those in Program 1, including the command organizations asso-
ciated with these forces, the logistics organizations organic
to these forces, and the related logistic and support units
which are deployed or deployable as constituent parts of mili-
tary or naval forces and field organizations.
Program 3 — Intelligence and Communications
consists of missions and activities directly related to
combat forces, but not a part of any of the forces listed in
Program 1 or 2 where independent decisions can be made.
Includes resources for primarily national or centrally directed
DOD objectives for intelligence and security, communications,
and specialized missions such as weather service, aerospace
rescue/recovery, and oceanography.
Program 4 — Airlift/Sealift
consists of airlift, sealift and other transportation





Includes command, logistic and support units
organic to these organizations.
Program 5 — Guard and Reserve Forces
consists of National Guard and Reserve training units.
Elements are arranged in program order to facilitate the
relating of the Guard and Reserve training forces to the
active forces.
Program 6 — Research and Development
consists of all R&D activities which are not related items
approved for procurement and deployment. The R&D costs related
to operational systems will appear in appropriate elements in
programs to which the weapons or support system may be
identified.
Program 7 — Central Supply and Maintenance
consists of supply and maintenance that is not organic to
other program elements. Includes nondeployable supply depots
and maintenance depots, both industrially-funded and non-
industrially- funded.
Program 8 — Training Medical and Other General Personnel
Activities
consists of training, medical, and other activities associ-
ated with personnel. Excludes training specifically identified
with another program element, and housing, subsistence, medical,
recreational and similar costs that are organic to a program
element such as base operations.
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Program 9 — Administration and Associated Activities
consists of resources for the administrative support of
departmental and major administrative headquarters, field
commands and administrative activities (not elsewhere accounted
for) , construction support activities and miscellaneous
activities
.
Program 10 — Support of Other Nations
consists of elements identified in Military Assistance
Program (MAP) and Agency for International Development (AID)
programs and those resources assigned to elements related to
the MAP or supporting it.
3. Budgeting Phase
The third phase of the planning-programming-budgeting
process is the Budgeting Phase. It is worthwhile to emphasize
here that the programming review is not considered as a substi-
tute for the annual budget review. Rather, it is designed to
provide a Defense Department-approved program to serve as a
basis for the preparation of the annual budget as well as guid-
ance for future planning. In the budget review it is necessary
to go into greater detail for the first year of the Five-Year
Program on procurement lists, production schedules, lead times,
prices, status of funds, and all the other facets involved in
the preparation of an annual budget. As mentioned earlier,
the funds are managed in terms of the program structure.
Therefore, the annual budget represents a detailed analysis of
the financial requirements for the first annual increment of
the approved Five-Year Program.
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In summary, the Secretary of Defense and his principal
military and civilian advisors are equipped with a system which
brings together at one place and at one time all the relevant
information which is required to make sound decisions on the
forward program and to control the execution of that program.
Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and his advisors are also
furnished with the necessary flexibility in the form of a pro-
gram change control system. Since McNamara's time, the United
States has had a comprehensive Defense Department-wide plan
that extends more than one year into the future. It is a
realistic and responsible one for programming not only the
forces, but also the men, the equipment, supplies, installations,
and dollars required to support them. Budgets are in balance
with programs, programs with force requirements, force require-
ments with military missions, and military missions with
national security objectives. The total budget dollars required
by the plan for future years do not exceed the Secretary's
responsible opinion of what is necessary and feasible.
The Secretary of Defense, with this management tool at his
command, is now in a position to perform the responsibilities
assigned to him by the National Security Act, namely, to
exercise "direction, authority, and control over the Department




D. THE PPB CYCLE
Inherent in the PPBS is an annual cycle of events leading
to the appraisal of a DOD budget for inclusion in the
President's annual budget. This cycle is called the calendar
year PPB cycle. The PPB cycle is never constant; it changes
every year to meet new requirements. An example of the 19 73
PPB cycle is discussed as follows [Ref. 6 ]:
The PPB cycle started in May with the issuance by JCS of
Volume I of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and
ended with the completion of the Defense budget in December
of the following year, a span of 19 months (Figure 1)
.
Volume I of JSOP was entitled Military Strategy and Force
Planning Guidance. The section on strategy provided statements
of the national security objective, derived military objectives,
global and regional appraisals, and strategic concepts for the
employment and support of forces. The force planning guidance,
prepared for combat commands and the services, was directed to
U. S. force capabilities and major contingencies.
The next step was the issuance, in September or early
October, of the SECDEF's Strategy Guidance, now called the
Defense Policy and Planning Guidance. It provided in one docu-
ment the essential national security policies established or
confirmed by the current Administration. The Policy and
Planning Guidance elaborated on those policies in force plan-
ning terms. It discussed the missions and tasks the forces
must be prepared to perform and the assumptions to be made





















































JSOP Volume I, as amended to reflect decisions made by the
President and the Secretary.
JCS followed in December with step three, which is JSOP
Volume II, Analysis and Force Tabulations. It took into con-
sideration the strategy guidance of Volume I, the recommenda-
tions of the services and the combat commands, and the policy
and planning guidance of the Secretary of Defense. In nine
books and eight annexes, it:
1. developed the major U. S. force requirements to exe-
cute the strategy for coping with global and regional threats,
2. recommended major U. S./Free World objective force
levels within the criteria of reasonable attainability and
prudent risk,
3. appraised the capabilities of major programmed forces
to meet the threat and execute the strategy, and
4. recommended force tabulations for the mid- range period
and for each fiscal year of the Five Year Defense Program.
The fourth step was the issuance, in February or early
March, of SECDEF's Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum.
It was the Fiscal Guidance issued in combination with other
important documents. One was an update of the policy and
planning guidance issued earlier in the cycle. It governed
all planning and programming from the date of its issuance
until specifically amended or superseded by the Secretary.
Another important enclosure was the Materiel Support Planning
Guidance, formerly called the Logistic Guidance (Figure 2).
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The issuance of the Fiscal Guidance gave the JCS, the Military
Departments, and the Defense Agencies the ceiling within which
they could prepare and submit the Joint Force Memorandum and
the Program Objective Memoranda.
As mentioned above, the Fiscal Guidance provides dollar
ceilings by fiscal year, by Service and Agency. Primarily for
illustrative purposes, it also distributes these dollars by
major mission and support categories. However, some totals are
not just for illustration. The Guidance FY1974-1978 places a
floor under spending for Strategic Forces and Support to Other
Nations and a floor and a ceiling around spending for Intelli-
gence and Security.
The fifth step was the submission in early May by JCS of
the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) . It provided the Secretary
with JCS recommendations in regard to fiscally constrained
major force and support levels. It included a summary of
analyses and an assessment of risks associated with the con-
strained forces as measured against the strategy and military
objectives of JSOP Volume I and Security's policy and planning
guidance. It covered the same eight years of the mid-range
planning period as the JSOP. It also highlighted major force
issues requiring decisions, including program costs and asso-
ciated manpower requirements.
Right on the heels of the JFM, each Military Department and
Defense Agency sent forward in late May its Program Objective
Memorandum (POM). The POM's provided a description of proposed
programs in terms of forces, procurement, manpower, and costs.
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They also stated the rationale for proposing these programs,
their readiness and capabilities to support the strategy, and
an assessment of the risks involved.
The seventh step on the PPB cycle was the preparation at
the Secretary of Defense level of the Issue Papers. Prepared
in June and July, these documents analyzed the Service proposals
in terms of their relation to (a) the policy and planning
guidance, (b) the balance between force structure, moderniza-
tion, and readiness, and (c) efficiency tradeoffs. They also
defined the issues, listed the alternatives, and evaluated the
capabilities and costs of those alternatives in terms of their
ability to implement the missions of the Department of Defense.
The Issue Papers were circulated to the JCS and the Services
for comments concerning accuracy and completeness before being
submitted for decision to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
The decisions made in the review of the Issue Papers were
released late July in the form of tentative Program Decision
Memoranda to the JCS, the Military Departments, and the Defense
Agencies. After comments had been received and major issues
discussed with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Program Decision Memoranda were
amended, as necessary, and reissued in August as the final pro-
gram guidance. The Department and Agencies then made the
required changes in their Program Objective Memoranda summary
tables so that the latter would now reflect the approved five-
year defense program for each DOD component.
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In early October the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies submitted the annual Budget Estimates for the dollars
needed to carry out the approved programs in the budget year.
The Program/Budget Decisions were released in late October
and November after review of those estimates by the budget
examiners of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) . They were put in final form in December
after the Departments and Agencies had had an opportunity to
comment, and became part of the President's Budget, which went
to Congress in January.
The 19 73 Planning-Programming-Budgeting Cycle, the PPB-
Programming Phase, and the Program/Budget Review Schedule for
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Table II. Program/Budget Review Schedule
Calendar Year 1973
Item Action Agency Action Date
1 Submit JSOP-Vol I (FY 75-82) -
Strategy and Force Planning
2 Identify and issue Selected
Analysis Topics
3 Submit JSOP-Vol II (FY 75-82) -
Analysis and Force Tabulations
4 Submit Joint Research and Develop-
ment Objectives Document (JRDOD)
5 Update Five Year Defense Program
through FY 74 - FY 78
6 Submit Telecommunications Subsystem
Data
7 Issue Planning and Programming
Guidance Memorandum
Note: Includes (1) Force Planning
(2) Fiscal Levels (3) Materiel
Support Planning Guidance
(4) POM Guidance (5) SEA Support
Guidance
8 Provide selected analyses
9 Submit JSOP-Vol I (FY 76-83)
Strategy and Force Planning
(CY 74 Cycle)
10 Submit Joint Force Memorandum (JFM)
11 Submit Program Objective
Memorandum (POM)
12 Update FYDP consistent with
POM FY 75-82
13 Submit FYDP Telecommunications
Subsystems Data
14 Transmit first Issue Paper to
Components
15 Transmit first Issue Paper to
SECDEF
16 Transmit last Issue Paper to
Components
17 Transmit last Issue Paper to
SECDEF
May 22, 1972
Dec 14, 19 72
Dec 22, 1972
Jan 15, 1973
Jan 19, 19 7 3
Feb 5, 19 7 3
Feb 23, 1973
Prior to
JC Mar 30, 1973
J May 1, 1973
J May 11, 19 7 3
c May 18, 1973
c May 18, 19 7 3
c May 28, 1973
Jun 12, 1973
Jun 18, 1973





Item Action Agency Action Date
18 Issue Program Decision Jul 26, 1973
Memorandum (PDM)
19 Submit reclamas to PDMs C Aug 6, 19 7 3
20 Major Issue Meetings OC Aug 8-14, * 73
21 Issue amended PDMs Aug 17, 19 73
22 Issue Budget Guidance Aug 17, 1973
23 Issue Defense Policy and Planning Sep 3, 1973
Guidance (CY 19 74 Cycle)
24 Identify and issue Selected Sep 10, 1973
Analysis Topics (CY 1974 Cycle)
25 Issue Materiel Support Planning Sep 14, 1973
Guidance (CY 19 74 Cycle)
26 Submit annual budget estimates and C Oct 1, 1973
backup information
27 Start Budget Hearings Oct 2, 1973
28 Update Five Year Defense Program C Oct 12, 19 73
29 Submit comments on Defense Policy JC Oct 19, 1973
and Planning Guidance
30 Submit comments on Materiel JC Oct 22, 19 73
Support Planning Guidance
31 Start issue of Program/Budget Oct 22, 1973
Decisions (PBDs)
32 Submit FYDP Telecommunications C Oct 22, 19 73
Subsystem Data
33 Provide comments (reclamas) C Oct 29, 1973
on PBDs
34 Issue revised PBDs based on O Nov 30, 1973
reclama comments to
Dec 10, 19 73
35 Conduct joint meetings with JCS Dec 7, 19 73
and Service Secretaries to dis-
cuss major unresolved budget
issues
36 Submit JSOP-Vol II (FY 76-82) J Dec 21, 1973




C = Military Departments and Defense Agencies
JC = JCS, Military Departments, Defense Agencies
Source: B. B. Moyer, Jr., "Evolution of PPB in DOD," NMSC
Handout, 9 February 19 73.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND
BUDGETING SYSTEM IN THE ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES
The author has observed that in the past five years, the
Thai Ministry of Defense has acted in many ways to modernize
the resource allocation systems with the goal of improving
control and management, while strengthening the capabilities
for implementing systems with greater emphasis on planning.
The Thai Ministry of Defense began improving its financial
management system in November 19 70, by forming a Resource
Management Feasibility Study Committee to review and discuss
system design, development and implementation. This Committee
later submitted a recommendation to form a task group to design
and guide the implementation of a resource management system
tailored to the unqiue needs of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.
With the approval of the Minister of Defense, several mobile
training teams consisting of U. S. Department of Defense (DOD)
officials and faculty members from the Defense Resources
Management Education Center (DRMEC) , Monterey, California,
have conducted three one-week seminars in Thailand nearly every
year since 1971.
The RTARF Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
Development, at present, progresses slowly and the system is
still unable to be implemented because of many barriers.
Major factors of resistence to improvement are the lack of
well-trained personnel to carry out the system, inadequate
training for young officers who will do the job, retirement
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of top-level management who support the systems, the hesita-
tion of new top management to introduce a new system, changes
in political policy, and no exact schedule for the system
implementation through the RTARF. This chapter examines how
far the Thai Ministry of Defense has developed its RTARF
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and what the RTARF
PPBS looks like. It explains solutions to the slow progress
toward the implementation of RTARF PPBS. It is hoped that
this chapter will benefit the people and organizations involved
with the RTARF PPBS. To date, this is the only document in
English on RTARF PPBS. It is hoped that it will benefit Thai
PPBS advisors from the United States in their work with the
Thai government. The order in which the various components
of PPB are discussed in this document is the order in which
they were addressed by the Thai government. It does not
represent, in the author's opinion, the recommended approach
to the development of a PPB system.
A. PURPOSE OF THAI PPBS
The main purpose of developing the Thai PPBS is to assist
top decision-makers by furnishing them with useful information
and cost-effectiveness analysis for alternative courses of
action in committing limited resources. The objectives of
the Thai PPBS include the following:
1. To help top management in choosing among alternative
courses of action.
2. To prepare military long-range plans to support
national security policies and objectives.
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3. To establish missions in relation to MOD needs and
military long-range plans in order to attain national security
objectives
.
4. To relate resource costs with MOD missions.
5. To close the gap between military planning and budgeting,
6. To set up programs in accordance with the national
security goal rather than with service priorities.
7. To formulate program structures to fit the MOD needs.
8. To equip decision-makers with cost-benefit analysis
techniques for selecting forces and weapon systems.
9. To help evaluate incomplete programs.
10. To provide a uniform information system needed by top
decision-makers
.
B. TENTATIVE THAI PPB CYCLE
The formulation of the tentative Thai PPB cycle has been
finished for more than two years and has remained unchanged.
The system has not yet been put into action, but includes the
following steps:
Step 1. July
Request for approval of the military plans by the
Supreme Command Headquarters (SCHQ) planning staff to the
Supreme Commander. This request must be made at least fifteen
months prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year.
Step 2 . August
Submission of the authorized plans to the Minister of




Submission by the Services and Defense Agencies of all
programs for approval to the Office of the Minister of Defense.
Step 4 . November
Issuance in November of budget guidance and calendar
by the Bureau of Budget (BOB) . The Minister of Defense will
forward those budget guidance, calendar, and MOD budget direc-
tives to the Services and Defense Agencies.
Step 5. December
Submission, in December, of budget requests by the
Services and Defense Agencies to the Office of the Minister of
Defense, and the Minister of Defense presents MOD budget esti-
mates to the Bureau of Budget.
Step 6. January and March
The joint meeting between January and March with the
representatives of the Services, Defense Agencies, and the
Bureau of Budget to review and discuss the budget requests.
After establishing the MOD budget ceiling, the Bureau of Budget
presents MOD budget estimates to the Cabinet. Upon receiving
the approval of the budget ceiling from the Cabinet, the Office
of the Minister of Defense will be notified of the approval
through the Bureau of Budget. The MOD Comptroller will prepare
budget details within the ceiling and then submit for approval
to the Minister of Defense.
Step 7. December
Submission, in December, of the authorized budget esti-
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Appropriation Bill, the Bill will be presented for approval
to the Parliament through the Cabinet. Upon approval by the
Parliament, the Bill will be declared as the Appropriation
Act for the next fiscal year.
C. PLANNING
The objective of Thai military planning is to maintain
adequate Armed Forces to be ready to fight against external
threats and internal insurgency for preserving the independence,
sovereignty, and national interests of Thailand. The planning
is mainly based on the National Security objectives, economic
condition of the country, political situations, and strategic
intelligence. The Supreme Command Headquarters is responsible
for military planning and the following activities:
1. To establish the military objectives in relation to
the National Security policies and objectives.
2. To prepare the strategic intelligence and furnish it
to the agencies concerned.
3. To establish the missions to accomplish the military
objectives
.
4. To assign the missions to each Service.
5. To analyze and evaluate military mission requirements.
Military requirements for each service are classified into
three categories:
a. Force units
b. Force support units
c. Support units
Each of these is divided into three phases:
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(1) Long-range requirements (10 years)
(2) Mid-range requirements (5 years)
(3) Short-range requirements (1 year).
The Long-range, mid- range, and short-range plans must be
rolling. The term "rolling" indicates that each year one
plan year is dropped and another year is added.
6. Requirement estimation on:
a. Manpower
b. Logistic activities:
(1) Weapons and equipment
(2) Constructions
(3) Operations and maintenance
(4) Training and education, etc.
7. Transformation of military requirement into budget
requirement.
D. REQUEST FOR PLAN APPROVAL
After authorization of military plans and requirements by
the Supreme Commander, the plans and requirements will be
presented for approval to the Minister of Defense. After the
approval, those plans and requirements will be forwarded to the
Services and MOD agencies so that they may be used as guide-
lines for military and financial requirements.
E. FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) consists of forces,
manpower, and cost elements. It contains all MOD approved
programs and projects. For support units, the FYDP may be
composed of only manpower and cost elements.
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All the Services and MOD agencies must prepare their own
FYDP. The FYDP must be presented for approval to the Minister
of Defense. After the approval, it becomes the MOD Five-Year
Defense Plan.
Costs may be categoried as follows:




F. APPROVED PROGRAM AND MILITARY REQUIREMENT CHANGES
Approved programs and military requirements will be up-
dated every year to fit changing situations. The long-range
plans will be revised at least every two years and/or when
there are changes in political policies, military situations,
socio-economy, technology, the changing policy of the big
power countries, and so on. The revised plans and programs
must be approved by the Minister of Defense.
G. PROGRAMMING
MOD programming is a combination of activities or program
elements relating to the mission. The purpose of programming
is to help improve decision -making to accomplish a definite
objective or plan which is specific as to what is to be done,
how much resource is required, and the benefit to be obtained.
Programming is also a bridge between planning and budgeting.
The construction of programs consists of three steps:
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1. The program will be designed as an operating tool
of the MOD manager. To accomplish this, it will include an
identification of homogeneous force data and support data
aggregated in a way to assist the decision-making process
within the Ministry of Defense. This is done by building the
program structure on what is known as force-related and
support-related programs. The following eight programs cur-
rently comprise the program structure and identify broad areas
of both forces and support [Ref. 7 ] .
Program 1 - Prevention and Counter-Insurgency
Program 2 - National Defense from External Aggression
Program 3 - Intelligence and Communication
Program 4 - Reserve Forces
Program 5 - Production and Development for Self-Suf ficiency
Program 6 - Personnel Supports
Program 7 - Training, Research and Education
Program 8 - Administration and Associated Activities
Programs 1-4 are force programs and Programs 5-8 are force
support.
2. The structure will be designed to allow both broad
aggregations of data, and presentations and analyses of data
that will be meaningful to different managers.
3. The structure will be designed in a manner to allow
the application of a systematic means of measuring actual use
of resources against planned and approved programs. This is
accomplished by consistency in accounting and budgeting terms,
the use of identifiable data associated with the program
structure, and the adaptability of these data to the chart
of accounts. The chart of accounts is the basis for the




These objectives have provided the nucleus around which
all Resource Management Systems within the Ministry of Defense
are based. Constant review and appropriate revisions will be
necessary to keep pace with new demands and requirements.
Adequate flexibility has been provided in the structure to
allow for expansion.
The force programs are sometimes classified as independent
programs and the force support programs as dependent programs.
For independent programs, top management can update the size
of the force and military requirements to meet the changing
situations of the world; but in general, the revision of de-
pendent programs can be made only when there are changes in
the independent programs, or simply speaking, changes of de-
pendent programs rely on changes of the independent.
In establishing programs, it is necessary to know what are
the major missions or activities required to attain the MOD
objectives. After the major programs have been established,
they must be divided into subprograms and program elements
(sub-subprograms) . This is to help direct the performance of
program elements to match the objectives of subprograms, the
performance of subprograms to match the objectives of major
programs, and major programs to match MOD objectives. In
addition, when the MOD budget is cut, the program facilitates
the cutting of less important projects, and it also provides
information to top management on the total amount of money
spent in each program, and what kind of work each Service is
carrying out in the same program.
60

The Thai tentative PPBS focuses on management and planning
but the existing budgeting system puts emphasis on expenditure
control in accordance with appropriation categories. The PPB
System will assist in the improvement of decision-making in
planning as well as the allocation of Defense resources among
various functions, missions and the Services. Since a modern
computer system is now utilized in the Ministry of Defense , the
transformation of program costs into appropriation category
cost, and vice versa, can be accomplished through a "budget
crosswalk," sometimes referred to as an electric FYDP.
A "Major program" is a combination of subprograms and
program elements designed to express the accomplishment of a
definite objective or plan which is specified as to the time-
phasing of what is to be done and the means proposed for its
accomplishment. The criteria for a determination of major
programs are as follows jRef. 8 J :
1. The major program must support the approved plans and
objectives
.
2. Its importance should exist both at present and in the
future.
3. It should be a major activity which top management is
always looking for the total budget spent on it.
4. It should be an important program consuming a great
amount of resources.
5. It must include many MOD activities.
6. A program which consumes few resources or consists of
a program elements or has special activities should be combined
with a similar or closely related program.
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7. Programs which consume less resources or consist of
a few program elements or have special activities but cannot
be integrated with any existing programs must be listed and
combined into one program.
8. Too many major programs should be avoided, so that top
management can make a quick and simple decision.
9. Major programs may cut across organization lines.
10. The formulation of major programs must consider not
only the present budget items but also future situations.
A "Subprogram" is a component of a major program. The pur-
pose of setting up subprograms in each major program is to
break down a major program into various minor programs. This
is to narrow the activities to be carried out to accomplish
the objectives of the major program. The following are cri-
teria for the development of a subprogram:
1. A subprogram must be a subdivision of a major program.
2. It must be an important activity and directly support
the objectives of its major mission.
3. It is a combination of program elements of similar
types
.
4. It is a project where top management can make simple
decisions
.
5. A number of subprograms in each major program should
be appropriate in order to provide adequate information for
decision-making.
A "Program element" is a description of a mission by the
identification of the organizational entities and resources
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needed to perform the assigned missions. Resources consist of
forces, manpower, materiel quantities and costs, as applicable.
The program element is the basic building block of the FYDP.
The criteria for the formulation of a program element are as
follows:
1. A program element should be designed to provide inform-
ation needed to meet its requirements for planning and control.
In addition, some resources within program elements will also
be defined to allow collections needed for special purposes
such as detailed supply costs for investment and logistical
use.
2. Operations costs are measured costs. Costs will not
be allocated or prorated to program elements. For special
analysis, prorations of costs will be necessary and these will
be built up from "cost models" to fit the needs of the analysis
3. All costs will be identified to the host activity
unless specifically chargeable to the tenant.
4. A program element should be identified in the highest
program (i.e., the program with the lowest number to which the
total of its output would most likely be associated)
.
5. Program elements in the mission programs should be
thought of as organizational entities and their associated
costs as opposed to a collection or display of things.
6. Mission program elements will be such that they do not
split the organization units. Elements should consist of
identifiable components of organizations to preclude alloca-
tion or proration of resources.
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7. A program element should be identified with planned
mission such as an F.8 6F squadron or output, that is, to the
results that are to be attained such as Base Operating Support.
8. Program elements are classified into two types as
(a) Mission, or (b) Service.
9. Mission program elements should always be charged with
the costs of services which are relatable and measurable and
obtained from service units, in addition to the operations and
investment costs routinely chargeable to the element.
Service program elements should reflect only those costs
which are not charged to mission elements.
10. Separate program elements will be established for oper-
ations costs that would otherwise have to be allocated or pro-
rated to two or more program elements.
11. Support program elements that relate two or more ele-
ments within a single program will be located directly below
the group of elements to which they relate.
12. Each program element should express its outputs in
quantitative terms.
13. The outputs of each program element should be expressed
in terms of final products.
14
.
Resources used in program elements should vary in
accordance with their outputs but not necessarily to the same
proportions
.
H. SCOPE OF PROGRAMS
Major programs represent the primary missions to be per-
formed. The scope of the eight tentative major programs
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currently identified in the MOD program budget structure are
listed and described below. Program elements are the forces,
weapon (or support) systems, and similar types of integrated
activities, by means of which the missions are accomplished.
Since the scope of many program elements was not necessarily
matched to existing appropriation activities or organizations,
it was initially somewhat indefinite.
1. Prevention and Counter Insurgency consists of missions
and activities related to prevention and counter insurgency,
civic actions and psychological operations, intelligence and
counter intelligence, prevention and suppression, frontier
coordination and operations, or any missions and activities of
similar types. This program is divided into four subprograms:
a. Civic Actions and Psychological Operations
This subprogram consists of organizations, activities,
and costs involved in civic actions and psychological operations,
for example, public welfare units, mobile development units,
radio broadcasting stations, mobile medical teams, training
and educational center, rural development units, road construc-
tion units, agricultural and industrial occupation promotion
units, and other activities of similar types.
b. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence
This consists of organizations, activities and
costs concerning intelligence and counter-intelligence such as




c. Prevention and Suppression
This consists of units, activities, and costs
relevant to prevention and counter-intelligence by land, by
sea, and by air. This subprogram also includes the combined
training and operational teams.
d. Frontier Coordinations and Operations
This consists of units, activities, and costs asso-
ciated with frontier coordinations and operations.
All costs related to the prevention and counter-
insurgency must be included in Program 1, except office sup-
plies and equipments, wages, salaries, and allowances of admini-
stration personnel are contained in Program 8.
The reason that the costs of intelligence and counter-
intelligence are listed under this program is to identify how
much the Ministry of Defense has spent of its annual budget in
these activities.
2. National Defense from External Aggression consists of
missions and activities related to the national defense from
external aggression, i.e., the force-oriented program elements,
including the command and organizations associated with these
forces, the logistics organizations organic to these forces,
and the related logistics and support units which are deployed
or deployable as constituent parts of military, naval, and air
forces, and the field organizations. This program also covers
the activities of mutual aid and common defense among the
allied countries but excludes all activities specified under
other programs such as intelligence and communications (Program
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3), reserve forces, production and development for self-
sufficiency. This program is broken down into four subprograms.
a. Land Defense
This subprogram consists of combat forces, combat
support units, and costs involved in providing land forces
in defense against the external aggression. These costs must
be associated with manpower supports (salaries and allowances)
,
weapons procurement, military constructions, and all other
costs directly related to land defense.
b. Naval Defense
This consists of combat forces, combat support units,
and costs relevant to naval forces in defense against the exter-
nal aggression. These costs must be related to manpower sup-
ports, weapons procurement, navy constructions, and all other
costs directly associated with naval defense.
c. Air Defense
This consists of combat forces, combat support
units, and costs relating to air forces in defense against the
external aggression. These costs must be relevant to manpower
supports, weapons procurement, air force constructions, and all
other costs directly related to air defense.
Those costs incurred in a, b, and c do not include
primary training costs, or regular trainings and education
in the Services.
d. Mutual Aid and Common Defense among Allied Countries
This subprogram includes costs of dispatching com-
bat forces or military units to oversea operations. Costs
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involved are cross training, and friendly country assistance
activities
.
3. Intelligence and Communications consists of missions
and activities directly related to intelligence, security,
and communications in different levels of the Ministry of
Defense, Supreme Command Headquarters, and the Services,
except the resources used for those missions and activities
in Program 1. This program is divided into two subprograms:
a. Intelligence and Security
This includes the costs of activities associated
with intelligence, counter-intelligence and security.
b. Communications
This consists of the costs of activities relating
to telecommunications and communications incurred by the
Supreme Command Headquarters, and the Services.
4. Reserve Forces consists of missions and activities
associated with Reserve training for combat readiness in order
to facilitate the using of Reserve training forces to support
the active forces. This program is divided into two subprograms
a. Territorial Defense
This includes the costs of ROTC and Territorial
Volunteer Defense trainings.
b. Mobilization and Reserve Control
This includes the costs of Armed Forces mobiliza-
tion and Reserve control for combat readiness.
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5. Production and Development for Self-Suf ficiency consists
of activities related to mapping, pharmaceutical and medical
supplies manufacturing, oil survey and industry, and materiel
production for self-sufficiency purposes both in peace and war
times. The "Development" appearing in this Program is not con-




This includes the costs of activities associated
with air photographic mapping, surveys and preparation of land
and sea maps. Examples are: air photography, developing and
prints, mapping and reproducing, map revision and modification,
geodesy, geophysics, town mapping, economic geography mapping,
and military topography analysis.
b. Pharmaceutical and Medical Supplies Manufacturing
This includes the costs of activities relating to
research, pharmaceutical and medical supplies manufacturing
funded from the MOD budget.
c. Oil Surveys and Refinery
This includes the costs of activities relevant to
crude oil surveys, digging, refinery, and maintenance of equip-
ments funded from the MOD budget.
d. Materiel Production
This includes the costs of production of weapons,
ammunition, explosives, ordnance equipments and materials,
costs of ship and aircraft buildings, and costs of production
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equipments and material involved in communications, ornaments,
supplies and scientific tools and equipments.
e. Other Military Equipments Production
This includes the costs of production of military
equipments other than specified in d.
6. Personnel Supports consists of activities related to
medicine, military welfares and veteran programs in order to
assist military men, civilians, workers and their dependents
in case of sickness. It also includes all welfare services
and veteran career promotions furnished by the Ministry of
Defense, Surpreme Command Headquarters, and Services. This
program is divided into three subprograms:
a. Medical Activities
This includes the costs of activities involving
hospitals, medical and nursing units.
b. Military Welfare Activities
This includes the costs of welfare activities for
military men, civilians, and workers of the Ministry of Defense,
Supreme Command Headquarters, and Services.
c. Veteran Activities
This includes the costs of activities concerning
veteran welfare and the Association of World War I Veterans.
The costs in a, b, and c do not cover the regular
administrative expenses in Program 8.
7. Training, Research and Education consists of missions
and activities associated with trainings, research, and edu-
cation to promote the personnel capabilities and operations
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and equipment development. This program is classified into
ten subprograms.
a. New Draftee Training
This includes the costs of activities relevant to
primary draftee trainings in the Armed Services.
b. Cadet Training and Education
This includes the operating and administrative
costs of the Military Academy, Naval Academy, and Air Force
Academy
.
c. Technical and Professional Training and Education
This includes the operating and administrative costs
of the technical and professional schools within MOD, Supreme
Command Headquarters, and the Armed Services levels.
d. Military Higher Education
This includes the operating and administrative
costs of military institutes of higher education within MOD,
SCHQ, and the Armed Services levels.
e. Aviation Training and Education
This includes the operating and administrative
costs of the aviation schools of the Armed Services.
f. Domestic Training and Education in Civilian
Institutes
This includes the costs of domestic training and
education of military personnel in civilian institutes in
accordance with the MOD ' s policy.
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g. Overseas Observations, Conferences, Training, and
Education
This includes the costs of observations, confer-
ences, training, and education of military personnel in foreign
countries within the MOD, SCHQ, and the Armed Services levels.
h. Operations Research and Development
This includes the activities and costs of operations
research and development involving personnel.
i. Military Equipment Research and Development
This includes the costs of research and development
of materiel and equipment.
j . Electronics and Communications Equipment Research
and Development
This includes the costs of research and development
regarding electronics and communications equipment.
8. Administration and Associated Activities consists of
costs of missions and activities related to major administrative
headquarters, field commands, general staff, technical staffs,
special staffs, training education staffs (Department level or
above) , and special activities other than the costs of those
in Program 1 through Program 7. This program is divided into
nine subprograms:
a. Major Administrative Headquarters
This includes the costs of activities associated
with the major administrative headquarters and field commands.
b. General Staffs
This includes the costs of activities relevant to




This includes the costs of activities relating to
the administration of the Technical Service Headquarters.
d. Special Staffs
This includes the costs of activities involving
the administration of the Special Staff Organizations.
e. Training and Education Staffs
This includes the costs of activities concerning
the administration of training and education, and the head-
quarters of various schools.
f. Veteran Activity Support
This comprises the costs of activities associated
with the administration of the World War I Veteran Association,
and the Veteran Welfare Organization.
g. Computer Activities
This constitutes the investment and operating costs
of the Armed Forces Computer Center other than salaries and
wages of personnel from the host units.
h. Compensations and Legal Contingencies
This includes the estimated costs of compensations
paid to the individuals or organizations in case of violations
or accidents. It also covers the costs of lawsuits and legal
contingencies
.
i. Other Essential Activity Supports
This includes the costs of activities related to
the secret service, Army Television Station, Armed Forces
Medical Society of Thailand, and other activities performed as
specified in the policies.
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The costs in subprograms a through g are classified
into appropriation categories such as salaries, wages, general





The budget process is the final phase in the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting Cycle. The annual budget expresses the
financial requirements necessary to support the approved Armed
Services and Defense Agencies programs which were developed
during the preceding phases of planning and programming. It is
through the budget that planning and programming are translated
into annual funding requirements. Each year's budget estimate,
therefore, sets forth precisely what the Armed Services and
Defense Agencies expect to accomplish with the resources
requested for that year. The Thai MOD budget process can be
briefly described as follows:
a. The budget process in response to the develop MOD
Resources Management System is a process following from the
military plans and policies. The formulation of the budget
follows the MOD major programs.
b. The MOD Finance Department is assigned as the MOD
Budget Bureau and is responsible for formulating the Five-Year
Defense Financial Plan based on the Defense Minister approved
plans and Five-Year Defense Program. This plan contains budget
estimates for the next five years.
c. The first year of the five-year financial plan is
the basis for the preparation of the following year's budget.
2. Modificat ion of Programs for Annual Budgeting
a. The Supreme Command Headquarters and the Armed
Services must have a joint meeting for modification of plans
and programs corresponding to the military situations and/or
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the Defense Minister's policies. This joint meeting must be
held at least fifteen months prior to the beginning of the
next fiscal year. Similarly, the Office of the Under-Secretary
of State and the Office of the Secretary to the Defense
Minister have to revise their plans and programs.
b. The updated plans and programs must be presented
for approval to the Minister of Defense at least one month
prior to submitting the budget estimates. After approval,
those plans and programs will be used as a basis for next year's
budget preparation.
3. Budget Guidance and Direction
a. The MOD Finance Department must issue the Budget
Directives at least 11 months prior to the beginning of the
next fiscal year.
b. Upon receipt of the Budget Guidance and the Budget
Calendar developed by the Bureau of Budget, the MOD Finance
Department must forward those documents to the Supreme Command
Headquarters, the Armed Services, and the Defense Agencies.
4
.
Budget Preparation and Submission
a. The Services and Defense Agencies must submit their
annual budget requests to the Office of the Minister of Defense.
Generally, the budget requests consist of:
(1) Expenditure Estimates. The expenditure esti-
mates must be formulated in accordance with approved plans and
programs, the budget guidance and directives. Comparison of
the current year and the next year budgets is required as well
as the justification of expenditure estimates of program elements
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The annual budget request has to be prepared in compliance with
the specified format.
(2) Receipt Estimates . In submission of receipt
estimates, the receipt categories, details, and explanations
must be provided in accordance with the specified format.
b. The MOD Finance Department is responsible for
classifying the Services and Defense Agencies budgets into sub-
programs and major programs in relation to the Thai Defense
Resources Management System.
c. The MOD Finance Department must submit the Defense
budget to the Minister of Defense for approval, and then, after
approval, resubmit the annual budget estimates to the Bureal of
Budget within the scheduled dates.
d. Once the Bureau of Budget completes its review of
MOD budget and needs, the budget package and ceiling are
returned to the Ministry of Defense for final preparation. The
MOD Finance Department will conduct joint meetings with the
Supreme Command Headquarters and the Services in order to up-
date the plans and programs in compliance with the budget ceil-
ing. The modified programs and budget estimates must be done
in conformity with the objectives of National Defense, and
military plans. Then the estimates are presented for approval
to the Minister of Defense and forwarded to the Bureau of
Budget after the approval.
5 . Budget Allocation
a. After the Appropriation Bill has been declared an
Act and the MOD appropriation is determined, the MOD Finance
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Department must present the budget allocations for the Services
and Defense Agencies to the Minister of Defense for approval.
b. Upon approval of the allocations, the MOD Finance
Department will forward the allocation to the Services and
Defense Agencies.
c. The Services and Defense Agencies must allocate
budgets to their subordinate units.
6 . Budget Execution and Control
a. The Services and Defense Agencies have to execute
and control their plans, programs, and budget in compliance
with the directives, rules, and regulations.
b. The Commanding Officer who authorizes payment must
classify the allocations into the expenditure categories and
must provide accounting control over funds of his unit by
showing, in compliance with the specified format, the alloca-
tions received, the obligations incurred, and the balance of
each expenditure category.
The Commanding Officer is authorized to transfer the
funds from one category to another in case there exists an
excess in one category and a shortage in another unless the
funding control has been specified otherwise.
c. Once the Minister of Defense has approved the budget
allocations, any later changes must also be requested for
approval to the Minister of Defense.
d. The authorization of payments or obligations must
comply with the rules and regulations. If anyone violates this
regulation, he must be responsible for his conduct unless he
has rejected the Commander's order by letter.
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e. The Commanding Officer under paragraph b must pro-
vide a monthly statement of payments as specified. The state-
ment must be submitted to the Services and Defense Agencies,
as the case may be, within 15 days after the end of the month.
The Services and Defense Agencies must also submit a summary
of payment for each program to the Minister of Defense through
the MOD Finance Department no later than the end of next month.
J. SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF PPBS IMPLEMENTATION
The author believes that the following suggestions will
make substantial progress toward the implementation of RTARF
PPBS .
1. Provide regular PPBS and systems analysis training pro-
grams on different levels for RTARF officers, with an emphasis
on long-period training for young officers who will carry out
the systems;
2. Try to get the active support, both formal and informal,
of top-level management of the Services and Defense Agencies;
3. Publish the schedule for the PPBS implementation through-
out the Armed Forces;
4. Insulate PPBS from politics as much as possible;
5. Make the Agency recognize that PPBS is essentially an
agency decision-making tool rather than a budget process.
6. Provide qualified agency staffs; and




IV. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: AN IMPORTANT TOOL TO SUPPORT PPBS
In the selection of weapon systems, in the design of forces,
and in the determination of the level of the national defense
effort, the judgment of the decision-makers can no longer be
intuitive or rely on past experience alone since the range of
choice is too broad and the number and types of alternatives
are too great. Therefore, to make better decisions, the decision-
maker needs a technique such as "systems analysis" to help his
judgment. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts
out the tangle of factors. It aims to assist the decision-
maker by furnishing him with the quantitative estimates of the
effectiveness and costs of each of the alternative courses
which he could choose. The purpose of this chapter is to dis-
cuss the systems analysis as an important tool to support PPBS
so that the RTARF officers will realize that in putting the Thai
PPBS into action, the application of systems analysis cannot be
avoided.
A. WHAT IS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Alain C. Enthoven [Ref. 9] has described systems analysis
in the U. S. Department of Defense as the application of methods
of quantitative economic analysis and the scientific method in
the broadest sense to the problems of choice of weapon systems
and strategy. It is a systematic attempt to provide decision-
makers with a full, accurate, and meaningful summary of the
information relevant to clearly defined issues and alternatives.
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E. S. Quade [Ref. 10] has defined systems analysis as a
systematic approach to help a decision-maker choose a course
of action by investigating his full problem, searching out
objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the light
of their consequences, using an appropriate framework, in so
far as possible analytic, to bring expert judgment and intuition
to bear on the problem.
Fred S. Hoffman [Ref. 11 ] has stated that systems analysis
played a central role in the system that evolved in the Defense
Department, and an understanding of its salient characteristics
is necessary to understand the PPB system. Systems analysis is
a term whose meaning has been eroded by very wide and diverse
usage. The sense of the term most relevant to PPB is the one
that describes the approach to national security during the early
19 50's. The approach evolved in response to the planning prob-
lems of the early post-World War II period.
Enthoven [Ref. 12 ] has further stated that the systems
analysis approach, as it is being applied in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, is a systematic attempt to bring to bear
on the problem of planning the defense program many relevant
disciplines, and to do so in an integrated way. The list in-
cludes traditional military planning, economics, political sci-
ence and other social sciences, applied mathematics, and the
physical sciences. Because Enthoven is an economist, he has
also emphasized systems analysis as applied economic analysis.
In contrasting operations research and systems analysis,




1. Systems analysis is an approach to broader problems
such as determining the preferred characteristics for a new
attack aircraft, the design of the POLARIS system, a deter-
mination of how many POLARIS submarines are required, or the
study of the number of antisubmarine ships or the number of
attack carriers that should be included in the U. S. Navy
force structure.
2. Systems analysis has broader orientation. It analyzes
alternative objectives and explores their implications. It is
focused more on exploring the implications of alternative assump-
tions than on analyzing in extensive detail the implication of
a single set of assumptions. Systems analysis ordinarily is not
concerned with computing an optimum solution. If there is optim-
ization involved, it is optimization in the large, rather than
in the small. Systems analysis is concerned with avoiding
gross errors and with giving the decision-maker a menu of choices
representing different mixes of effectiveness and cost so that
he can make his choices. It is part of systems analysis to
question the objectives.
3. Systems analysis takes problems that are not defined and
attempts to define them. If the problem cannot be well defined,
that is, specified in all its aspects, systems analysis tech-
niques are still useful in helping the decision-maker by
attempting to define those aspects of the problem that can be
defined and quantified. Systems analysis emphasizes design of
new solutions and widening of the range of alternatives, rather




4. The epistemology of systems analysis is the epistemol-
ogy of the inexact sciences. Statistics may be used, although
in most major weapon systems problems the uncertainties are
greater than the statistical variations, so that extensive use
of mathematical statistical techniques is not likely to produce
useful results. Systems analysis emphasizes techniques for
dealing with uncertainty, such as sensitivity tests, the use of
ranges, alternative scenarios, and the like.
5. Systems analysis emphasizes the basic economic con-
cepts, mostly of simple concepts of marginal products and mar-
ginal cost. The systems analysis approach has developed a
variety of techniques of analyzing complex problems of decision
in such a way as to make calculation the servant of informed
judgment. It has made use of calculation, but it puts much
less emphasis on it.
Today, the national security requires a more efficient
utilization of resources. Defense decisions depend heavily on
systems analysis, applied within the context of a modern manage-
ment system, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting.
B. THE NEED FOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The need for systems analysis exists not only in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
headquarters of the military departments, but also at the other
levels of the management structure in the Defense Establishment.
After all, the purpose of this function is to help reduce the
uncertainties involved in making choices among alternatives and
such choices have to be made at many different echelons. The
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areas of interest, the problems, and the subject matter will be
different at these different levels, but the general approach
and the techniques will be basically the same.
This objective, therefore, has been to build an integrated
and mutually supporting structure of systems analysis through-
out the Defense Establishment, with the broadest kind of exchange
of information and techniques at and among various levels. This
arrangement provides the checks and balances so essential to
minimizing parochial viewpoints and organization bias. The
systems analyst, like any other scientist, must always be pre-
pared to submit his work to critical scrutiny, and not just by
other systems analysts. This is one of the great merits of the
scientific method, it is an open, explicit, verifiable, and self-
correcting process.
From a small beginning, systems analysis has now become a
vital and integral part of the Defense Department decision-
making process. The new programming function provides the LINK
between planning and budgeting, relating both the forces and
their resources costs to major military missions. Systems anal-
ysis provides the analytical foundation for the making of sound
objective choices among the alternative means of carrying out
these missions. Thus, the Secretary of Defense now has the
tools he needs to take the initiative in the planning and direc-
tion of the entire Defense effort on a truly unified basis.
C. THE ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS
The central importance of the model can be seen most read-
ily, perhaps, by looking at its relation to the other elements
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of analysis. E. S. Quade [Ref. 14 ] has discussed the follow-
ing five elements. Each of them is present in every analysis
of choice, although they may not always be explicitly identified.
1. The Objective (or objectives ) . Systems analysis is
undertaken primarily to help choose a policy or course of action.
The first and one of the most important tasks of systems anal-
ysis is to discover what objectives the decision-maker is, or
should be, trying to obtain through the options open to him,
and how to measure the extent to which they are, in fact,
attained. This done, strategies, forces, or equipment are ex-
amined, compared, and chosen on the basis of how well and how
cheaply they can accomplish these objectives.
2. The Alternatives . The alternatives are the means by
which it is hoped the objectives can be attained. They need
not be obvious substitutes or perform the same specific func-
tions. Thus, to protect civilians against air attack, shelters,
"shooting" defenses, counterforce attack, and retaliatory stri-
king power are alternatives.
3. The Costs. The choice of a particular alternative for
accomplishing the objective implies that certain specific re-
sources can no longer be used for other purposes. These are
the costs. In analyses for a future time period, most costs
can be measured in money, but their true measure is in terms of
the opportunities that they preclude. Thus, if the objective
is to compare ways to eliminate guerrillas, the injury or death
of nonparticipating civilians caused by the various alternatives





4. A Model (or models ) . A model is a representation of
realty which abstracts the features of the situation relevant
to the question being studied. The means of representation may
vary from a set of mathematical equations or a computer pro-
gram to a purely verbal description of the situation, in which
judgment alone is used to assess the consequences of various
choices. In systems analysis, or any analysis of choices, the
role of the model (or models, for it may be inappropriate or
absurd to attempt to incorporate all the aspects of a problem
in a single formulation) is to estimate the consequences of the
choice; that is, the cost that each alternative will incur and
the extent to which each alternative will attain the objective.
5. A Criterion . A criterion is a rule or standard for rank-
ing the alternatives in order of desirability and indicating
the most promising. It provides a means for weighing cost
against performance.
D. PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ANALYSIS
A good analysis requires answering many questions, such as:
What is the problem? How complex is it? Is there any uncer-
tainty involved? What are the alternative solutions to the
problem? What are the criteria of effectiveness? These ques-
tions are primarily problems for a military planner, although
he can doubtless profit in their formulation from cooperation
with operations researchers and/or systems analysts.




1. It is all important to tackle the "Right" problem.
A large part of the investigators' efforts must be invested
in thinking about the problem, exploring its proper breadth,
and trying to discover the appropriate objectives and to search
good criteria for choice. If the best set of alternatives
is not chosen to compare it means the best solution will not
be discovered. If the wrong objective has been chosen, then
the wrong solution to the problem might be found. Getting
an accurate answer to the wrong question is likely to be far
less helpful than an incomplete answer to the right question.
2. The analysis must be systems oriented. Rather than
isolating a part of the problem by neglecting its interactions
with other parts, an effort should be made to extend the bound-
aries of the inquiry as far as required for the problem at
hand, to find what interdependencies are important, and to
study the entire complex system. This should be done even if
it requires the use of purely intuitive judgment.
An interdisciplinary team of persons having a variety of
knowledge and skills is helpful here. This is not so merely
because a complex problem is likely to involve many diverse
factors that cannot be handled by a single discipline. More
importantly, a problem looks different to an economist, an
engineer, a political scientist, or a professional bureaucrat,
and their different approahces may contribute to finding a
solution.
3. The presence of uncertainty should be recognized, and
attempts made to take it into account. Most important decisions
87

are fraught with uncertainty. In planning urban development,
there are uncertainties about city growth patterns, about the
extent to which freeways or rapid transit systems will be
used, about costs, about tax revenues, about the demand for
services. For many of these things, there is no way to say
with confidence that a given estimate is correct. The analyst
attempts to identify these uncertainties and evaluate their
impact. Often he can say the value of a parameter will be
more than A but less than B. Sometimes it is possible to indi-
cate how the uncertainty can be reduced by further testing
and how long that will take. Most important, the analyst
should determine the effect of uncertainty on the answers.
This is done by a sensitivity analysis that shows the answers
change in response to changes in assumptions and estimates.
The study report should include the presentation of a con-
tingency table showing the effectiveness and cost associated
with each significant alternative for various future environ-
ments and for each set of assumptions about the uncertainties.
4. The analysis attempts to discover new alternatives as
well as to improve the obvious ones. The invention of new
alternatives can be much more valuable than an exhaustive com-
parison of given alternatives, none of which may be very
satisfactory.
5. While in problems of public policy or national security
the scientific method of controlled repeated experiment cannot
be used, the analysis should strive to attain the standards
traditional to science. These are (1) intersub jectivity:
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results obtained by processes that can be duplicated by others
to attain the same results; (2) explicitness : use of calcula-
tions, assumptions, data, and judgments that are subject to
checking, criticism, and disagreement; and (3) objectivity:
conclusions that do not depend on personalities, reputations,
or vested interests. Where possible, these conclusions should
be in quantitative and experimental terms.
E. EXAMPLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
To help clarify how systems analysis works as an important
tool of decision-making in PPBS , an example of the quantitative
aspect of systems analysis, described by Enthoven [ Ref. 16 ]
is illustrated as follows:
Suppose that, all operational factors considered, each
missile has a 50 percent chance of destroying a target, and
there are 10 enemy targets to be destroyed. Assume that there
is a requirement to destroy 90 percent of the targets. If one
missile is programmed per target, on the average the 100 pro-
grammed missiles can be expected to destroy 50 targets (50 per-
cent of 100 targets) . If two missiles are programmed per tar-
get, then 200 missiles can be expected to destroy 75 targets,
and so forth. On the average, a force of 340 missiles can be
expected to destroy 90 targets. Table III shows the average
number of targets destroyed for different forces.
The question immediately arises as to whether it is worth
the cost of 340 missiles to destroy 90 targets. An even more
important question is, is it worth the price of 16 extra mis-




Comparison of Different Size of
Missile Forces and Target Destroyed










Source: S. A. Tucker, Ed., A Modern Design for Defense
Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology,
p. 165, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
1966.
to 90; or of 140 extra missiles to raise the average number of
targets destroyed from 75 to 90? This means, at the margin,
that raising the required average number of targets destroyed
frmo 89 to 90 costs 16 missiles, or in other words, the 341st
missile will add one-sixteenth of one target to the average
number of targets destroyed. Therefore, it is very important
for the analyst to describe the concepts of marginal cost and
marginal product (marginal effectiveness) for the decision-
maker. However, the fact that raising the required damage level
from 89 to 90 costs 16 missiles does not necessarily mean that
it is not worth doing so. It depends upon the decision-maker
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to judge at what point the extra target destruction caused by
more missiles is no longer worth the extra cost. This illus-
tration reveals the distinction between marginal and average
costs. If it were not made, the decision-maker might be mis-
led into thinking that because, on the average, 340 missiles
destroy 90 of the 100 targets, whence about 3.8 missiles must
be expended for each target destroyed, the 90th target also
costs 3.8 missiles to destroy.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was
developed and implemented in the U. S. Department of Defense
in the early 19 60's in order to give the Secretary the inform-
ation and management tools he needed to develop defense pro-
grams in the national interest. PPBS was intended to facili-
tate budgeting in terms of military forces and weapon systems
instead of the resource categories of military personnel,
procurement, operation and maintenance, research, and construc-
tion. Costs were to be decided for the lifetime of a system,
not just for the budget year. Finally, such data were to be
utilized in analysing quantitatively the cost effectiveness
and benefit of alternative programs or systems. Planning and
programming are carried out in terms of major mission and
support programs. Both at the Secretary of Defense and Military
Service levels, there exists an in-house capacity for quantita-
tive analysis of alternatives. Programming decisions are
expressed in the annual updating of a five-year defense program.
It identifies the five-year requirements for each Service by
major program categories. Budget estimates are formulated and
approved to implement the first year of the five-year projec-
tions. The planning and programming phases of PPBS have enabled
the Secretary of Defense to see major force and support issues
and have helped him to make effectively his decision. This
thesis is an attempt to investigate how the Royal Thai Armed
Forces planning, programming, and budgeting system was developed.
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The thesis also includes the discussion of systems analysis as
an important tool to support PPBS
.
The development of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System in the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) was aimed at im-
proving its financial management system by using the U. S. PPBS
concepts and ideas, and adapting them to fit the Thai needs,
environments, and cultures. In the past five years, the Thai
Ministry of Defense has acted in many ways to modernize its
resource allocation systems with the goal of improving control
and management, while strengthening the capabilities for imple-
menting systems with greater emphasis on planning. In November
19 70, the Resource Management Study Committee was formed to
review and discuss the system design, development and imple-
mentation. This committee later submitted a recommendation to
form a task group to design and guide the implementation of PPBS
tailored to the unqiue needs of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.
The Thai Ministry of Defense now has established eight
tentative major programs consisting of the following four mission-
oriented and four support-oriented programs. Each major program
is broken down into subprograms and program elements.
Program 1 — Prevention and Counter-Insurgency
Program 2 — National Defense from External Aggression
Program 3 -- Intelligence and Communication
Program 4 — Reserve Forces
Program 5 — Production and Development for Self-Suf ficiency
Program 6 -- Personnel Supports
Program 7 -- Training, Research and Education
Program 8 -- Administrations and Associated Activities
Systems Analysis, as used in the Defense Establishment, is
the application of methods of quantitative economic analysis
and the scientific method to the problems of choice of weapon
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systems and strategy. It is a systematic attempt to provide
decision-makers with a full, accurate, and meaningful summary
of the information relevant to clearly defined issued and
alternatives. Today, the national security requires a more
efficient utilization of resources. Defense decisions depend
heavily on systems analysis within the context of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting Systems. The need for systems
analysis exists not only in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the headquarters of the
military departments, but also at the other levels of the manage-
ment structure in the Defense Establishment. The elements of
analysis consist of (1) An objective or objectives, (2) Alter-
natives, (3) Costs, (4) A model or models, and (5) A criterion.
The effective analysis should comprise these principles:
(1) Tackle the right problem, (2) Be systems oriented,
(3) Recognize uncertainty and take into account, (4) Attempt to
discover new alternatives as well as to improve the obvious
ones, and (5) Strive to attain the standards traditional to
the science.
The RTARF Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, at
present, progresses slowly and the system is still unable to
be put into operation because of many barriers. The important
factors apparently resisting the improvement are the lack of
well-trained personnel who will carry out this System, the
retirement of top-level management who support the concept,
the hesitation about new systems by new top management, and
the changes in political policy. These problems can be solved
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by (1) providing PPBS and systems analysis regular training
programs at all organizational levels, (2) obtaining active
support of top-level management, (3) setting an exact schedule
for the PPBS implementation, (4) having no effect on PPBS
implementation when political policy changes, (5) creating a
general perception that PPBS is essentially a decision-making
tool rather than a budget process, (6) requiring qualified
agency staffs, and (7) providing sufficient agency staffs,





The MOD program structure consists of the following major
programs, subprograms, and program elements:
Major programs :
1. Prevention and Counter-Insurgency
2. National Defense from External Aggression
3. Intelligence and Communication
4. Reserve Forces
5. Production and Development for Self-Sufficiency
6. Personnel Supports
7. Training, Research and Education
8. Administrations and Associated Activities
1. Prevention and Counter-Insurgency
a. Civic Actions and Psychological Operations
(1) Psychological Operations Unit
(2) Public V7elfare Unit
(3) Mobile Rural Development Teams
(4) Radio Broadcasting Stations Unit
(5) Public Assistance Unit
(6) Mobile Medical Teams
(7) Geographical Survey for Development Preparation
Units
(8) Training and Education Unit
(9) Youth Activities Promotion Unit
(10) Public Development Unit
(11) Road Construction Unit
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(12) Public Relations Unit
(13) Religious Activities Support Unit
,
(14) Agricultural and Industrial Occupation
Promotion Unit
(15) Fresh Water Well Construction Unit
(16) Protein Produce Expansion Unit
(17) Staff Inspections
(18) Motor Vehicle Support Unit
(19) Flight Training Unit
(20) Housing Construction and Repairs
b. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence
(1) Intelligence—Armed Forces Intelligence
Operations Center
(2) Counter-intelligence—Armed Forces Security
Center
c. Prevention and Suppression
(1) Land Combat Force
(2) Naval Combat Force
(3) Air Combat Force
(4) Joint Training and Operations
d. Frontier Coordinations and Operations
(1) Frontier Coordination Committee
(2) Frontier Operations Unit
2. National Defense from External Aggression
a. Land Defense
(1) Land Combat Forces








(b) Second Army Area
Third Infantry Division
(c) Third Army Area
Fourth Infantry Division
(d) Armored Division
(e) Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division
Twenty-third Regiment Combat Team
(f) Ninth Infantry Division
(g) Fifth Military Division
Fifth Regiment Combat Team
(h) Special Warfare Center
(i) Army Aviation Regiment
(j) 101st Artillery Battalion
(k) Engineer Department Royal Guard
(1) Signal Battalion, Army Headquarters
(2) Support Units
(a) First Army Area Headquarters
(b) Second Army Area Headquarters
(c) Third Army Area Headquarters
(d) Fifth Military Circle Headquarters
(e) Combat Support Forces Headquarters, Second
Army Area
(f) Combat Support Force Headquarters, Fifth
Military Circle
(g) First Military Circle
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(h) Second Military Circle
(i) Third Military Circle
(j) Fourth Military Circle
(k) Fifth Military Circle
(1) Sixth Military Circle
(m) Seventh Military Circle
(n) Lcpburi Military District
b. Naval Defense
(1) Naval Combat Forces
(a) Surface Operations Ships
- D.E./D.R./A.P.D.
- P.C./P.C.E
- P.G.M. 165 - 101/ T.P.L
- Sloops
- M.P.G.








(d) Naval Air Force
- S. F.





(e) Fleet Marine Force
- Marine Battalion
(2) Combat Force Supports
(a) Replenishment Group
(b) Bangkok Naval Base Station
(c) Sattahib Naval Base Station
(d) Songkhla Naval Base Station
(e) Traad Naval Base Station
c. Air Defense














(g) Territorial Joint Combat Squadrons
(h) Transport Squadrons
- C-47A








(2) Air Combat Support Units
(a) Office of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief
(Donmuang)
(b) Air Wings (1 to 7)
(c)- Radar and Communication Activities
d. Mutual Air and Common Defense among Allied Countries
(1) Joint Training among Allies
(2) Actions in compliance with Commitments to Allies
(3) Friendly Country Assistance
3. Intelligence and Communication
a. Intelligence and Security
(1) Security Center
(2) Intelligence Operations Center
(3) Armed Forces Intelligence
(4) Intelligence, Army Directorate of Intelligence
(5) Offices of the Military Attache
(6) Intelligence, Naval Director of Intelligence
(7) Offices of the Naval Attache
(8) Intelligence, Air Force Directorate of
Intelligence
(9) Offices of the Air Force Attache
b. Communications
(1) Telecommunication
(2) Joint Communication Battalion, SCHQ
101

(3) Signal Battalion, Army
(4) Naval Communication Center






(2) Non-Commissioned Officers Training
(3) Territorial Volunteer Defense Training Supports
b. Mobilization and Reserve Control
(1) Army Mobilization Training and Reserve Control
(2) Naval Mobilization Training and Reserve Control
(3) Air Force Mobilization Training and Reserve
Control
5. Production and Development for Self-Suf ficiency
a. Mapping
(1) Air Photographic Mapping
(a) Air Photography, Developing and Prints
(b) Mapping and Reproducing
(c) Map Revision and Modification





(e) Military Topography Analysis
(3) Surveys and Preparation of Sea Maps
b. Pharmaceutical and Medical Supplies Manufacturing
(1) Armed Forces Pharmaceutical Factory
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c. Oil Surveys and Refinery
(1) Crude Oil Surveys
(2) First Oil Refinery
(3) Second Oil Refinery
d. Materiel Production
(1) Production of Weapons, Ammunitions, and
Explosives
(a) Light Weapons Factory
- H.K.33
- Submachine Guns
(b) Hand and Rifle Grenades Factory
(c) Rifle Ammunitions Factory
(d) Explosive Powder Factory
(e) Fuse Factory
(f) Ordnance Parts and Equipment Factory
(2) Ship Building and Equipment Manufacturing
(3) Aircraft Construction and Equipment Manufacturing
(4) Communications Equipment Manufacturing
(5) Clothes and Leather Manufacturing
(a) Clothes and Decorations Factory
(b) Boots/Shoes and Leather Factory
(c) Canvas and Fiber Equipment Factory
(6) Scientific Equipment Manufacturing
(7) Food Production
e. Other Military Equipments Production
6 . Personnel Supports
a. Medical Activities
































Overseas Combat Center Hospital
Surasakdimontri Hospital
Udorn Military District Hospital
Other Nursing Units






(3) Air Force Hospitals and Associated Activities
(a) Air Force Medical Service Department
(b) Bhumibol Adulyades Hospital
(c) Chantarubeksa Hospital
(d) Fifth Wing Hospital
(e) Other Nursing Units
Military Welfare Activities
(1) Dependent Tuition and Fee Supports
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(a) Office of the Under-Secretary





(a) Office of the Under-Secretary




(3) Housing Construction and Facilities
(a) Office of -the Under-Secretary




(4) Sports and Games




(5) Fresh Water Procurement








(a) The Association of World War I Veterans






7. Training, Research and Education
a. New Draftee Training
(1) Army New Draftee Training
(2) Navy New Draftee Training
(3) Air Force New Draftee Training
b. Cadet Training and Education
(1) Military Preparatory School
(2) Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy
( 3) Naval Academy
(4) Air Force Academy
c. Technical and Professional Training and Education
(1) Military Industrial School
(2) Judge Advocate General's School
(3) Military Technical Training School
(4) Armed Forces Survey Academy
(5) Intelligence School
(6) Security School
(7) Army Non-Commissioned Officer School
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(8) Naval Non-Commissioned Officer School
(9) Air Force Non-Commissioned Officer School
(10) Infantry School
(a) Field Grade Officer Course
(b) Company Grade Officer Course
(c) Non-Commissioned Officer Course
(d) Non-Commissioned Officer Student Course
(11) Cavalry School
(12) Artillery School





(18) Medical Field Service School
(19) Veterinary School
(20) Quartermaster School
(21) Military Police School
(22) Adjutant School
(2 3) Finance School
(24) Nursing Schools (Army, Navy, and Air Force)
(25) Basic Officer School
(26) Electronics School
(27) Welding Schools (Army, Navy, and Air Force)
d. Military Higher Education
(1) National Defense College
(2) Army War College
107

(3) Naval War College
(4) Air Force War College
(5) Armed Forces Staff College
(6) Army Command and General Staff School
(7) Naval Command and General Staff School
(8) Air Force Command and General Staff School
(9) Advanced Engineer School
(10) Senior Officer School
(11) Joint Operations School
(12) Psychological Warfare School
(13) Logistical School
e. Aviation Training and Education
(1) Army Aviation School
(a) Fixed Wing Aircraft Course
(b) Helicopter Course
(c) Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Course
(d) Radio Repair Course
(2) Air Force Flight Training School
(a) Primary Flight Training Course
(b) Secondary Flight Training Course
(c) Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Course
(d) Radio and Communication Equipment Repair
Course
f. Domestic Training and Education in Civilian Institutes





g. Overseas Observations, Conferences, Training and
Education
(1) Training and Education in Military Institutes
(a) Technical Schools
- Officer Course
- Non-Commissioned Officer Course
(b) Military Advanced Schools
- War Colleges
- Other Advanced Schools
(2) Training and Education in Civilian Institutes
(a) Medical Training and Education




(3) Observations and Conferences
(a) Conferences
(b) Observations
h. Operations Research and Development
(1) Studies of Draftee Viewpoints
(2) Research of Psychological Operations
(3) Research of Military Small Unit Capability
(4) Research of Personnel Field Type Equipment -
Number and Weight
i. Military Equipment Research and Development
(1) Measurement of Deterioration Rate of Equipment
in Southeast Asia Region
(2) Grass Planting Study
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(3) Life Sustaining Project for People Working
in the Air
(4) Ambush Protecting Vehicle Project
(5) Special River Patrol Craft Project
(6) Army Equipment Development Project
(7) Armed Forces Vehicle Testing Area Project
(8) Armed Forces Light Weapons Testing Area
Project
(9) Military Equipment Testing and Evaluation
Project
Electronics and Communi cat ions Equipment Research
and Development
(1) Antenna Project
(2) Infiltration Electronics Censor Project



















Radio Frequency Interference of
Ubol-Station
Radio Frequency Interference of Lopburi
Station
Navy Antenna Coupler
Radio Frequency Interference Study






8. Administration and Associated Activities
a. Major Administrative Headquarters
(1) Office of the Secretary of the Minister
(2) Office of the Under-Secretary of State
(3) Office of the Supreme Commander
(4) Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
(5) Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
(6) Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force
(7) The Air Force Headquarters
(8) The Operations Fleet Headquarters
(9) The Tactical Air Command Headquarters
b. General Staffs
(1) The Secretariat Department
(2) Directorate of Joint Personnel
(3) Army Directorate of Personnel
(4) Naval Directorate of Personnel
(5) Air Force Directorate of Personnel
(6) Directorate of Joint Intelligence
(7) Army Directorate of Intelligence
(8) Naval Directorate of Intelligence
(9) Air Force Directorate of Intelligence
(10) Directorate of Joint Operations
(11) Army Directorate of Operations
(12) Naval Directorate of Operations
(13) Air Force Directorate of Operations
(14) Directorate of Joint Logistics
(15) Army Directorate of Logistics
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(16) Naval Directorate of Logistics
(17) Air Force Directorate of Logistics
(18) MOD Finance Department
(19) Office of the SCHQ Comptroller
(20) Office of the Army. Comptroller
(21) Air Force Finance Department
c. Technical Staff (Logistics Support Group)
(1) Armed Forces Survey Department Headquarters
(2) Engineer Department Headquarters
(3) Naval Dockyard Department Headquarters
(4) Aeronautical Engineer Department Headquarters
(5) Post Engineer Department Headquarters
(6) Army Civil Engineer Department Headquarters
(7) Directorate of Joint Communications Headquarters
(8) Army Signal Department Headquarters
(9) Air Force Signal Department Headquarters
(10) Naval Communications Department Headquarters
(11) Army Ordnance Department Headquarters
(12) Naval Ordnance Department Headquarters
(13) Air Force Ordnance Department Headquarters
(14) Army Transportation Department Headquarters
(15) Naval Transportation Department Headquarters
(16) Air Force Transportation Department Headquarters
(17) Army Quartermaster Department Headquarters
(18) Naval Supply Department Headquarters
(19) Air Force Quartermaster Department Headquarters
(20) Army Medical Department Headquarters
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(21) Naval Medical Department Headquarters
(22) Air Force Medical Service Department Headquarters
(2 3) Army Veterinary and Remount Department
Headquarters
(24) Army Science Department Headquarters
(25) Naval Science Department Headquarters
d. Special Staffs
(1) King's Aides-de-Camp Department
(2) Judge Advocate General's Department
(3) Defense Energy Department
(4) Military Industrial Department
(5) Army Preserved Food Division
(6) Armed Forces Adjutant General's Department
(7) Army Adjutant General's Department
(8) Naval Adjutant General's Department
(9) Air Force Adjutant General's Department
(10) Army Provost Marshal General's Department
(11) Army Inspector General's Department
(12) Naval Inspector General's Department
(13) Air Force Inspector General's Department
(14) Army Finance Department
(15) Naval Finance Department
(16) Army Special Services Department
(17) Naval Welfare Department
(18) Air Force Special Services Department
(19) Naval Hydrographic Department
(20) Naval Meteorologival Department
(21) Air Force Civil Aviation Department
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e. Training and Education Staff
(1) Directorate of Education and Research
(2) Army Training Command Headquarters
(3) Naval Education Department Headquarters
(4) Air Force Directorate of Education and
Training Headquarters
(5) Office of the Supreme Commander
(6) Naval Senior Officer School Headquarters
(7) Air Force Flight Training School Headquarters
f. Veteran Activity Support
(1) World War I Veteran Association
(2) Veteran Welfare Organization
g. Computer Activities
(1) Computer Center, Office of the SCHQ Comptroller
(2) Computer Section, Air Force Finance Department
h. Compensations and Legal Contingencies
(1) Office of the Under-Secretary of State and
Office of the Secretary of the Minister






i. Other Essential Activity Support
(1) Secret Service Activities
(a) Office of the Under-Secretary of State






(2) Army Television Station Support
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